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Clarifying Costs: Can Increased Price
Transparency Reduce Healthcare Spending?
Morgan A. Muir,*1Stephanie A. Alessi,**2 and Jaime S. King***3
As healthcare expenditures continue to climb, politicians, business leaders, and patients
avidly search for new methods to reduce healthcare costs. In an eleven-point plan released in
2012, a group of the nation’s top healthcare experts listed “full transparency of prices” as one
potential solution to reduce healthcare costs. The experts, some of whom helped write the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, argued that price transparency would allow
consumers to compare prices before choosing a provider or hospital and, consequently, better
anticipate their overall costs. In turn, they argued that making price information publicly
accessible would also reduce excess healthcare spending by encouraging providers to offer more
competitive pricing.
Other health services research, however, suggests that legislative and regulatory efforts
to promote price transparency may result in increased healthcare costs depending on the market
conditions and the various stakeholders targeted. Consequently, any price transparency
initiative must not only make prices transparent, but also account for the differences between
markets, either by reducing the economic inefficiencies that keep price transparency from being
effective or by precisely targeting the specific regions where the market would support such an
initiative.
This article analyzes whether price transparency initiatives can effectively reduce
healthcare costs, and if so, what conditions must exist for them to do so. The features of a welldesigned price transparency initiative will vary depending upon the targeted population
(patients, employers, providers, or insurers) and the particular features of the target market. We
argue that the most effective solutions will mandate disclosure of price and quality information
at the appropriate stakeholder levels and, simultaneously, break down provider market leverage
where it prevents price transparency from helping consumers. Together, these two elements
have the potential to lower healthcare costs. Finally, we present four possible price
transparency initiatives that represent a range of possible alternatives, including litigation,
legislation, regulation, and consumer driven initiatives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the United States spent $2.7 trillion dollars on healthcare.4 National healthcare
expenditures accounted for 17.9% of the gross domestic product and have nearly doubled since
2000.5 In recent years, American businesses have begun to falter under the weight of providing
affordable insurance to their employees, and the number of uninsured Americans has increased
to over 46 million.6 The need to reduce healthcare costs is more apparent than ever and the
Affordable Care Act has brought numerous cost-reduction initiatives to the forefront.
In August 2012, several of the nation’s top healthcare experts who helped write the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) included “price transparency” in an eleven-point plan to reduce
health costs.7 They argued that price transparency would permit consumers to compare available
prices and anticipate overall costs before choosing a provider or hospital.8 In turn, publically
accessible price information would encourage providers to offer more competitive pricing and

4

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2011 HIGHLIGHTS, available at
http://cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
Downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited February 11, 2013).
5
Id.
6
ROBIN A. COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CDC, HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2011, at 2 (2012)
[hereinafter 2011 NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/
earlyrelease/insur201206.pdf.
7
Ezekiel Emanuel et al., A Systemic Approach to Containing Healthcare Spending, NEJM, Aug. 1, 2012, available
at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsb1205901.
8
Id.
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thereby reduce excess healthcare spending, a view consistent with predictions of standard
economic theory.9
However, whether price transparency will have this effect on the healthcare market
remains speculative. Those who believe price transparency alone will reduce healthcare costs
assume that the healthcare market will respond like other industries. Economists have long
concluded that markets work best when consumer prices reflect the actual cost to create and
deliver the product.10 In fact, a majority of the empirical studies on price transparency in other
markets shows that transparency initiatives tend to lead to more consistent, lower prices.11 While
similarities exist between healthcare and other consumer markets, some economists believe price
transparency will not ameliorate rising healthcare costs due to unique characteristics of the
healthcare market.12
One major difference is that patient demand for healthcare services generally does not
respond in the same manner as consumer demand for other goods in terms of price elasticity,
which estimates how consumer demand changes as price changes.13 Consumers can delay
healthcare due to cost, but once a condition becomes severe or life threatening, consumers will
generally seek care regardless of price. This makes the demand for certain healthcare services
uniquely inelastic. Price inelasticity in the healthcare market is further exacerbated by the fact
that consumers generally learn of their healthcare costs after receiving care, making these costs
seemingly unavoidable. In addition, complex billing practices, secretive insurer-provider
contracts, the sheer number of third party payers, and major quality variances in delivery of
healthcare may mean that it will be difficult for price transparency initiatives to achieve
economic efficiency.14
Unfortunately, the unique characteristics of this market make analogies and predictions
based on other markets less reliable. Each unique quality of the healthcare market is analogous
to another market, but no one market contains all of the special characteristics of healthcare.
Loosely analogous to corporate managers, who make business decisions that affect the price of
stockholders’ shares, are providers, who negotiate with insurers over covered treatments and
procedure prices and also make recommendations that drive patient demand for the same
procedures. Thus, a price transparency initiative that targets consumers alone may be less
effective than a multi-faceted one that targets decisions made at the insurer-provider level as
well. Similar to the automobile and airline industry, price discrimination can affect healthcare
prices when providers charge different payers different prices for identical services, adding to the
growing price discrepancies for healthcare within the same geographic region.15 Further, third
party payers insulate consumers from the full price of healthcare, allowing price to play less of a
role in treatment choice than location, physician quality, or other non-price factors.
9

Id. at 2–4; see also CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: DOES PRICE TRANSPARENCY EFFECT MARKET EFFICIENCY?
IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN OTHER MARKETS FOR THE HEALTHCARE SECTOR (Apr. 29 2008)
[hereinafter CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS].
10
Robert Murray, Setting Hospital Rates to Control Costs and Boost Quality: The Maryland Experience, 28
HEALTH AFF. 1395, 1397 (2009).
11
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 9.
12
Id. at 4–5.
13
Su Liu & Deborah Chollet, Price and Income Elasticity of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care
Services: A Critical Review of the Literature—Final Report, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. (Mar. 24, 2006).
14
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 5.
15
Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Price of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind A Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 58
(2006).
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Over 30 states are currently considering or pursuing legislation to increase price
transparency.16 To date, most transparency initiatives have targeted consumers. However,
initiatives targeting the insurers, providers, and employers may prove more effective. This
article analyzes the current debate about price transparency in the healthcare market and the role
that law and policy play in the implementation of price transparency initiatives to lower the cost
of healthcare. The analyses herein will critique existing price transparency initiatives and
examine ideas for new initiatives that may benefit the healthcare market today.
Part II provides information on the healthcare market as it relates to price transparency
and presents different potential price transparency intervention points. Parts III, IV, and V
examine initiatives directed at these intervention points – the consumer, insurer-provider, and the
employer levels, respectively – in more depth. For each intervention point, the article analyzes
the potentially substantial legal barriers and other obstacles to price transparency. Part VI
examines current transparency legislative initiatives across the country – with a special focus on
California – as well as the potential for regulation from the Health Benefit Exchanges. Part VII
then analyzes a range of possible price transparency initiatives aimed to effectively target each
specific intervention point, including consumer and employer education, antitrust litigation, state
legislation, and state agency regulation. These potential solutions serve as a framework for
analyzing price transparency initiatives, accounting for varying healthcare market conditions,
differences in legislation and regulations on price transparency across the country, and the range
of market barriers and legal hurdles discussed in each Part.
Lastly, based on the analysis in Part VII, Part VIII recommends four possible legal,
regulatory, and educational solutions that might be taken alone or in combination to form an
effective price transparency initiative. By offering several potential solutions to simultaneously
reduce anticompetitive behavior in healthcare markets and make price and quality information
available in a meaningful way, these proposals provide healthcare consumers a viable path
toward fair and visible prices.17
II. THE HEALTHCARE MARKET AND PRICE TRANSPARENCY
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Center for
Health Statistics (NCHS), an estimated 46.3 million persons of all ages (15.1% of the United
States population) were uninsured in 2011.18 Sixty-four percent of insured persons were covered
by private health insurance plans – 82.1% of those persons obtained employer-based coverage,
while 15.3% purchased their plan independently of their employers.19
The price of healthcare goods and services carries a different meaning depending on the
targeted party. Whereas co-pays and monthly premiums matter most to individual consumers,
healthcare providers are most affected by reimbursement rates paid by private and public health
16

Anna D. Sinaiko & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Increased Price Transparency in Healthcare—Challenges and
Potential Effects, 364 New Eng. J. Med. 891, 891 (2011).
17
While the analyses and recommendations provided herein use California as the target case study, many of the
issues also pertain to markets in other states across the country.
18
ROBIN A. COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CDC, HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2011, at 2 (2012)
[hereinafter 2011 NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/
earlyrelease/insur201206.pdf.
19
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT (2012),
available at http://www.census.gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html.
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insurers. Therefore, revealing certain healthcare costs to the wrong party will not be as useful or
as effective in lowering healthcare costs as a more appropriately targeted approach.
Insurers, providers, employers, and individual consumers are all potential targets for price
transparency initiatives. Price information aimed at facilitating competition between providers
or insurers differs from information aimed at providing guidance to consumers. To illustrate
these potential points of intervention for transparency initiatives, consider the following example
of an MRI: Provider A’s gross charge for an MRI is $2,000.20 However this is not the price an
insurer pays, or the price for which the insured consumer is responsible. For this MRI, Provider
A has negotiated a rate of $1,000 with Insurer X and a rate of $1,500 with Insurer Y, but Patient
B will pay a copay of $50 with Insurer X or a 10% co-insurance of $150 with Insurer Y.
The effect of any particular price transparency initiative will depend significantly on the
targeted entities, the relevant market conditions, the usefulness of the information disclosed, and
the ability of the targeted entity to act on that information. A well-designed price transparency
initiative that takes into account these factors can reduce healthcare costs, while others will have
little effect, or worse, could increase healthcare costs.
The following sections demonstrate different price disclosures at each of the consumer,
insurer-provider and employer levels, and their impact.
III. CONSUMER- LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY
The goal of consumer-level price transparency is to create better-informed consumers of
healthcare.21 The hope is that well-informed consumers will use easily accessible and
comprehensible price and quality information to purchase lower-priced, higher-quality
healthcare, thereby changing market demand and lowering overall prices. Consumers of
healthcare include both individual persons and employers who purchase healthcare benefits for
employees. This section focuses on the individual consumer, while Part IV tackles the issues
surrounding employer-level price transparency. Consumer-directed price transparency initiatives
can mandate disclosure of prices at two points: 1) individuals at the point of plan selection; and
2) individuals at the point of provider/treatment selection. While many existing consumer-level
transparency initiatives target individuals, these initiatives have had only moderate levels of
success because patients do not have access to complete price and quality information in an
easily comprehensible and usable format.22
Price transparency at the individual consumer level concerns the amount of payment for
which the consumer is responsible. For uninsured consumers, the price of care is also the same
as the total payment to the provider. However, for insured consumers the price they pay for care
often represents only a small fraction of the overall cost; the insurance plan will pay for the rest,
often at negotiated and discounted rates. Prior to selecting a health plan, individuals typically
receive information on the different pricing structures associated with various insurance
companies. Access to meaningful price and quality comparison data would enable consumers to
carefully evaluate health plans before becoming a customer. Historically, at the point of plan
selection, consumers have had access to plan premiums, deductible, and coinsurance amounts.
20

The gross charge for a medical procedure is the price billed to uninsured consumers. This amount is often
different from the actual price recovered by providers.
21
Id. at 894.
22
JH Hibbard & E Peters, Supporting Informed Consumer Health Care Decisions: Data Presentation Approaches
That Facilitate the Use of Information in Choice, 24 ANNUAL REV. PUB. HEALTH 413 , 414–16.
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However, as more individuals move into high deductible health plans (HDHPs), consumers will
have to pay the actual prices of specific services out of pocket, making provider costs also
relevant to plan selection. Once enrolled in a health plan, consumers will require additional
information regarding the price tiering of providers within their chosen plan, such as whether
certain providers will require a higher level of coinsurance or copay. Price transparency
initiatives targeting individual consumers should offer access to provider reimbursement rates
that, along with provider quality information, can assist consumers in plan and provider
selection. Unfortunately, providing meaningful price and quality information in a usable format
for individual consumers has proven very challenging. Attempts to do so have resulted in only
marginal consumer uptake.23
A. IMPLICATIONS OF CONSUMER-LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY
Economists and health policy scholars have debated the effects of transparency on the
healthcare market for years.24 While traditional economic theory argues that access to
meaningful information in any market will result in a decrease in product cost,25 others caution
that, in the healthcare market, price transparency may result in unintentional effects, including
price increases, if not implemented properly.26 This Part describes these different theoretical
effects and considers the reasoning behind each in order to better craft an economically efficient
initiative.
In 2008, Congress commissioned the Congressional Research Service (CRS) to examine
the effect of greater price transparency on the healthcare market.27 The CRS ultimately
concluded that greater price transparency might lead to lower prices.28 In preparing the Report,
CRS examined several empirical studies on price transparency in other markets and several
economists’ opinions on what these studies predict for the healthcare market. Generally, the
Report concluded that if the healthcare market reacts to price transparency in the same way as
other markets, then increasing the transparency of price information available to consumers will
improve competition and drive down prices.29 On the other hand, because of the special
characteristics of healthcare, the Report also warns that increasing price transparency may
increase prices in certain situations.30
Michelle Kim, a PhD in healthcare management and economics, also uses economic
theory to examine the effect of transparency measures on the healthcare market.31 Her
23

CRS Report for Congress, supra note 9.
See, e.g., JH Hibbard, J Stockard, and M Tusler, “Does publicizing hospital performance stimulate quality
improvement efforts?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 2003; 22(2): 84–94 (demonstrating that the debate about transparency
in the healthcare market goes back at least a decade).
25
Cutler & Dafny, supra note 36, at 894.
26
Id. at 894; see also Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 892.
27
CRS Report for Congress, supra note 9.
28
Id. at 33–4.
29
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 39 (citing Per Baltzer Overgaard, Market Transparency,
Information Exchange and Competition, presented at the workshop on Competition Strategies and Competition Law,
Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, Helsinki, Oct. 14, 2003, available at
http://mit.econ.au.dk/vip_htm/povergaard/pbohome/webpapers/transpcomphelsinki.pdf).
30
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 38 (citing Morten Hviid & H. Peter Møllgaard, Univ. of
Copenhagen, Dep’t of Econ., Countervailing Power and Price Transparency (Ctr. for Competition & Regulation,
Working Paper CCR 01-2, 2001) (arguing when less informed buyers can observe prices negotiated by more
informed buyers, sellers are less willing to offer lower prices to the informed buyers)).
31
Michelle Kim, The Effect of Hospital Price Transparency in Healthcare Markets (2011) (Ph.D. dissertation in
Health Care Management and Economics, University of Pennsylvania).
24
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dissertation focused on the clearinghouse model for transparency. This model focuses on the
effects of consumers who have access to a list of prices charged by different sellers in a market,
and assumes that “informed” consumers with access to such a list will choose the lower-cost
products, whereas “uninformed” consumers without access will purchase products in the market
at random.32 Kim reports the effect of healthcare price transparency on (1) market share, (2)
market efficiency, and (3) price sensitivity among medical care consumers.33 In terms of market
share, Kim states that if more informed consumers search for the lowest priced providers, the
market will experience a shift in consumers away from fee-for-service plans.34 However, Kim
notes the difficulty of providing price and quality information to consumers in one central
location, as opposed to piecemeal reporting of quality information on one website and price on
another.35 Without quality information available in the same location as price information, Kim
suggests that consumers will be unable to choose lower-priced providers.36 Instead, consumers
will continue to equate cost with quality, likely causing prices to remain constant, if not
increase.37 Kim’s results for consumer price sensitivity suggest that increased price transparency
in a cost sharing system will lead to a reduction in healthcare expenditures, but only if it is
possible to provide cost and quality information together so that consumers can understand the
true value of services before receiving them.38
At the consumer level, many empirical studies of consumer-directed transparency
initiatives have reported little to no effect on healthcare prices.39 If these consumer-targeted
initiatives have any hope of affecting the healthcare market, it will be essential to link quality to
price and to present consumers with this information in a useful and easily digestible format.
Otherwise, an initiative could have no effect—or worse, increase costs through collusion, for
example.40
To avoid the potential for an increase in healthcare costs, David Cutler and Leemore
Dafny argue that disclosing more limited price information, such as average provider
reimbursement rates instead of complete cost information, may make price cuts to certain
insurers less detectable, collusion efforts more difficult, and prices less likely to rise.41 But,
while the disclosure of average prices reduces price secrecy, such limited disclosures will not be
sufficient to also affect patient healthcare decisions. In practice, average prices can depict such
an expansive range that consumers are often unable to draw helpful price comparisons among
providers. Further, limited disclosure cannot capture the many variables that affect price
variation – including condition severity, geographic location, and quality of provider – that will
inevitably affect price.42
While research on the effects of price transparency often generates mixed predictions and
unknown results, one consistent conclusion prevails: Making price information publicly
32

Id. at 16.
Id. at 61–69.
34
Id. at 12.
35
Id. at 30.
36
Id. at 68.
37
Id. at 128–29.
38
Id. at 66. Note that Kim’s study used charges billed and not actual out-of-pocket costs.
39
See, e.g., supra Part V.A.1.
40
See, e.g., supra Part III.A, discussing the potential for increased costs due to price transparency at the insurerprovider level.
41
Cutler & Dafny, supra note 36, at 895.
42
The limitations of average price disclosure are discussed in more detail in Part IV.B.
33
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available must be done with extreme care in order to begin to shape healthcare decision-making
and avoid unwanted price increases.
B. BARRIERS TO CONSUMER-LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY
Unfortunately, even well thought-out price transparency initiatives face significant
barriers to success. At the consumer level, trade secrets protections, contractual barriers, general
provider resistance, the question of whether consumers will seek out available price information,
and complex cost-shifting and complex billing practices in the healthcare market create hurdles
to achieving price transparency that must be cleared before implementing a successful initiative.
Trade secret protections, contractual barriers, and provider resistance will be addressed in the
following section. This section on consumer based-initiatives will address consumer usage, and
complex cost-shifting and billing practices.
1. QUESTIONABLE CONSUMER USAGE
Even if a health policy initiative were successfully enacted, many health policy experts
warn that consumers may not use this information in the ways previously described.43 If
consumers will not comparison-shop for their healthcare like they do for other consumer
products, making healthcare prices readily available to consumers will have very limited effects
on healthcare spending.44
Major changes in healthcare billing practices may need to occur before transparency
aimed at consumers can be expected to drive down the cost of healthcare.45 Uwe Reinhardt,
Professor of Political Economy and Economics at Princeton University in the area of health
policy, has argued that consumer-directed reforms cannot positively impact the healthcare
industry unless hospital billing practices are reformed to allow consumers to readily understand
how and for what services they will be charged.46 The current chaotic system of hospital pricing
would, if made completely transparent to the public, be akin to “forcing sick and anxious people
to shop around blindfolded for cost-effective care.”47 Because prices negotiated with hospitals
vary more than prices negotiated with providers, regulating hospital pricing structures should be
a priority.48 Effective consumer-directed price transparency will require translating the
complicated language of healthcare billing into easy-to-understand information if consumers are
expected to utilize that information in their decision-making.49
Even if hospital prices became more user-friendly and readily available, consumers may
not use it when making decisions about where to receive treatment and from whom. Health
services research demonstrates that patients are more likely to base treatment decisions on the
experiences of friends and family members than cost.50 Further, in the absence of accessible and
comprehensible quality information on providers, patients may inaccurately equate lower prices
with lower quality services, defeating the purpose of price transparency.
43

GAO REPORT ON PRICE TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67 (citing CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9);
Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 211 (stating consumers will not use information they do not understand).
44
GAO REPORT ON PRICE TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67 (citing CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9);
Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 211 (stating consumers will not use information they do not understand).
45
Reinhardt, supra note 15; see also infra Part IV.A.1.
46
Reinhardt, supra note 15.
47
Id. at 68.
48
Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 213
49
See CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM, supra note 35, at 1–2.
50
Anna D. Sinaiko, How Do Quality Information and Cost Affect Patient Choice of Provider in a Tiered Network
Setting? Results from a Survey, Health Serv Res. 2011 Apr: 46(2):437–56, 451; see also Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation, National Survey on Americans as Health Care Consumers: An Update on the Role of Quality
Information, (Menlo Park, Calif.: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2000).
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Ultimately, a consumer-directed initiative alone cannot change the course of healthcare
spending. In the right circumstances, initiatives aimed at increasing transparency of prices at the
provider-insurer level are more likely to reduce costs. Therefore, whether consumers become
more informed purchasers of healthcare as a result of a price transparency initiative is not
dispositive of the effectiveness of price transparency overall. However, a consumer-targeted
initiative may be a helpful piece of a larger price transparency strategy, so long as consumers are
able to understand and effectively use price information in their decision-making processes.
2. COMPLEX COST-SHIFTING AND BILLING PRACTICES
Complicated healthcare billing practices also pose additional challenges to the
implementation of effective consumer-based price transparency measures. The complex series
of cost-shifts in the healthcare industry—from the insurer, through multiple providers, to the
consumer—also contributes to potential difficulties for individual consumers and employers in
obtaining complete price information.51 For hospital procedures, both in- and out-patient
services, the billing passes through multiple providers, e.g., the anesthesiologist, surgeon, and the
hospital. Provider networks can minimize some complexity, as insurers have access to innetwork prices in advance based on their contractual relationship with those providers. But as
soon as a patient sees one out-of-network provider in the chain, estimating costs in advance
becomes more problematic.
Questions of consumer usage and complex billing practices must be addressed as part of
launching an effective consumer-based price transparency initiative.
However, before
consumers can access the information, numerous barriers must be overcome to obtain price
information from insurers and providers. Each presents a formidable challenge to implementing
effective price transparency initiatives and will be discussed in further detail in Part IV.
IV. INSURER-PROVIDER LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY
Between insurers and providers, numerous legal and practical mechanisms prevent
disclosure of negotiated price terms that hinder price transparency. Currently, confidentiality
clauses and so-called “gag clauses” in provider-insurer contracts ensure that knowledge of
negotiated prices stay between the parties in privity of contract.52 Insurers and providers may
also seek to protect the confidentiality of their prices as a trade secret. Lastly, providers may
simply resist any price transparency initiative that may compromise their bottom line. As a
result, third party insurers, providers and consumers are kept in the dark as to the prices being
charged and collected.
Using the illustration introduced above, Provider A charges Insurer X a lower rate than it
charges Insurer Y. However, because the contract price terms between Provider A and Insurer X
are protected by a gag clause, Insurer Y is unable to use those price terms to negotiate a lower
rate with Provider A. Mandating price transparency of negotiated rates at the insurer-provider
level may facilitate more competitive pricing by allowing Insurer Y to use its knowledge of the
contract with Insurer X to negotiate a lower rate. This would, in theory, drive down overall
healthcare costs as competitors would be able to use their knowledge of these prices to increase
their bargaining leverage and negotiate for lower prices.
A. EFFECTS OF PRICE TRANSPARENCY AT THE INSURER-PROVIDER LEVEL
However, theory may not always turn into practice. Unlike its conclusions on the effects
of consumer-level price transparency, CRS warned that, because of the special characteristics of
51
52

CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 8–12.
See infra Part IV.A.
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healthcare, increasing price transparency might increase prices at the insurer-provider level.53
For instance, the same report on the effects of consumer-level price transparency highlights the
effects of price transparency on the airline industry, which, like the hospital industry, has high
fixed costs and a non-storable product.54 After the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, increased
competition led to lower fares for consumers and lower salaries for many employees. The most
valuable components of the industry, however, such as pilots and mechanics, like highly
specialized surgeons in healthcare, did not experience a salary reduction.55 The Report
concluded that well-designed price transparency initiatives, however, could improve efficiency,
while permitting innovative and highly valued providers to remain highly compensated.56
However, pilots do not have a similar ability to stimulate demand for their services in the way
that surgeons do, which can continue to lead to higher overall costs.
Cutler and Dafny similarly analogize to other markets in order to analyze the potential
effects of price transparency on the healthcare market.57 Their article on increased price
transparency looks to the Danish ready-mix concrete industry in the early 1990s, where Danish
authorities implemented a price transparency policy against suspected anticompetitive practices
by publishing actual invoice prices.58 Within one year from the dissemination of that
information, average prices in the industry rose 15 to 20%.59 The most likely explanation for the
price increase is that publishing transaction prices quickly revealed competitor price cuts, which
made it easier for ready-mix concrete firms to avoid competition.60
Given the varied hypotheses and dearth of actual studies, the effect of price transparency
on the healthcare market remains largely uncertain. It seems at least possible that some price
transparency initiatives could lower healthcare costs in certain markets, but this may be merely
one piece to the larger transparency puzzle. Initiatives targeted at providing greater transparency
between insurers and providers could, on one hand, inspire providers to raise prices to a uniform
or near uniform level. On the other hand, transparency at the provider-insurer level could
empower insurers to negotiate for lower prices, which would contribute to an overall decrease in
healthcare prices. For a transparency initiative at the insurer-provider to have a chance to lower
healthcare costs, it must first overcome certain legal obstacles that currently keep price data
concealed.
B. BARRIERS TO INSURER-PROVIDER PRICE TRANSPARENCY
At the insurer-provider level, confidentiality clauses, or “gag clauses,” in provider-insurer
contracts prevent consumers and competing providers from knowing negotiated provider rates.
Second, to oppose mandated price transparency or prohibitions on gag clauses, providers and
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CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 38 (citing Morten Hviid & H. Peter Møllgaard, Univ. of
Copenhagen, Dep’t of Econ., Countervailing Power and Price Transparency (Ctr. for Competition & Regulation,
Working Paper CCR 01-2, 2001) (arguing when less informed buyers can observe prices negotiated by more
informed buyers, sellers are less willing to offer lower prices to the informed buyers)).
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CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 33.
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Id.
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Cutler & Dafny, supra note 36.
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Id. at 895; see also CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 31, 38–39; STEPHEN MARTIN, Chapter 3:
Collusion and Tacit Collusion, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 49, 56–57 (2001).
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MARTIN, supra note 53, at 56-57 (stating that it is not possible to explain the price increase in terms of demand
factors because “[d]uring this period, there was no particular boom in the construction industry, the major user of
ready-mix concrete”); see also CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 31, 38–39.
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MARTIN, supra note 53, at 57.
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insurers may also allege trade secret protection of negotiated prices to prevent disclosure of that
information.
1. CONTRACTUAL BARRIERS
Contract terms can prevent disclosure of negotiated rates to anyone outside of the
contracting parties.61 This section addresses the barriers to price transparency created by
confidentiality clauses, also called “gag clauses,” and most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses. Gag
clauses in contracts between insurance companies and providers currently constitute a significant
barrier to third party disclosure of much of the relevant healthcare pricing information.62 These
gag clauses between hospitals and manufacturers of healthcare devices can even keep physicians
from knowing true price information about the technology they use every day, 63 leaving some
providers without an incentive to contain costs by reducing unnecessary tests and treatments.64
An MFN clause, on the other hand, is a contractual agreement that prohibits a provider from
giving any other insurer a deeper discount than the contracting insurer. Both gag clauses and
MFN clauses can thwart transparency efforts and have the effect of unnecessarily raising
consumer costs.
a. Gag Clauses
While some existing price transparency initiatives circumvent these contractual
obligations by disclosing cost ranges or gross prices, such figures are not specific enough to be
useful for consumers or employers in making purchasing decisions. More specific price
information, however, is often subject to “gag clauses” in contracts between insurers and
providers that prohibit the contracting parties from disclosing the negotiated prices with third
parties. These gag clauses allow insurers to pay “must-have” providers, or anchor providers—
that is, essential providers to a health plan—higher than market prices for services, without other
providers’ knowledge.65 Further, they prevent payers and consumers from knowing the
differences in provider-negotiated rates. Without the ability to compare prices, providers,
payers, and consumers cannot be sure they are getting a competitive price. Price transparency
initiatives to eliminate gag clauses at the insurer-provider level would allow other insurers and
providers, who are not parties to the contract, to know the prices their competitors charge or are
being charged for specific services.
Gag clause prohibitions can produce varied effects depending upon specific market
dynamics. In markets with high levels of competition, eliminating gag clauses might give
insurers more incentives and leverage, if consumers gravitate toward low-cost, high-quality
providers. Under those circumstances, providers will not be able to insist on higher rates unless
they have the cost and quality measures to support that demand. However, this model assumes
that, in highly competitive healthcare markets, cost and quality information is available, easilyaccessible, and that patients will use it to make healthcare decisions. To date, no data is
available to support this assumption. Even worse, in markets without substantial competition,
61

GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-791, 15 HEALTH CARE PRICE TRANSPARENCY: MEANINGFUL PRICE
INFORMATION IS DIFFICULT FOR CONSUMERS TO OBTAIN PRIOR TO RECEIVING CARE 1 (2011) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT ON PRICE TRANSPARENCY].
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Jeffrey C. Lerner et al., The Consequences of Secret Prices: The Politics of Physician Preference Items, 27
HEALTH AFF. 1560, 1561 (2008).
63
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-126, MEDICARE: LACK OF PRICE TRANSPARENCY MAY HAMPER
HOSPITALS’ ABILITY TO BE PRUDENT PURCHASERS OF IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES 29–31 (2012).
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SHANNON BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED: WHY TOO MUCH MEDICINE IS MAKING US SICKER AND POORER 28–42
(2008).
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Berenson et al., supra note 24, at 973.
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transparency of prices paid to “must-have” providers may encourage other providers with as
good or better quality measures to demand even higher prices, thereby driving up the cost of
healthcare in those markets.
Efforts to eliminate gag clauses that target provider and insurer behaviors can translate
into lower or higher costs overall. At best, providers might be forced to provide valuable,
transparent reasons for charging higher prices, such as quality measures or being the only
provider in a healthcare market who offers certain services, or else lower their prices to maintain
a profitable patient base. At worst, this might allow competing providers to demand higher
prices, driving up costs.66 Market concentration and the negotiating power of providers must be
addressed before price transparency can truly be effective. But identifying this possibility, and
the market conditions that create it, can enable policymakers to design around this concern.
Unfortunately, successful price transparency initiatives to remove gag clauses may prove
more elusive when aimed at affecting consumer choice. Unlike insurers and providers who may
have a more complete understanding of codes and healthcare pricing structures, consumers on
the whole do not and cannot effectively use information they do not understand.67 In order for
disclosure of insurer-provider negotiated prices and quality information to consumers to help
lower healthcare costs, the information must be easily accessible and comprehensible, not simply
available.68
Just as transparency interventions aimed at the insurer-provider level may result in a
benefit to consumers by creating lower prices, consumer-level disclosure may, in turn, affect
providers and insurers by allowing consumers to demonstrate where their demand lies, thereby
creating a more level playing-field for contract negotiations. Returning to the MRI cost example
from Part II, a price transparency initiative eliminating the gag clause in the contract between
Provider A and Insurer X can create these mutually beneficial results. First, Insurer Y would
gain access to the $1,000 rate between Provider A and Insurer X. This would give Insurer Y
increased bargaining leverage and allow it to negotiate for a lower rate. Second, eliminating the
gag clause would allow individual consumers and employers to comparison shop between
Insurer X and Insurer Y. In choosing the insurer with the lowest reimbursement rate, Insurer X,
consumers have the ability to increase the demand for Insurer X’s rate. This would also give
Insurer Y more leverage at the bargaining table to negotiate for a lower rate. Both levels of price
transparency, therefore, have the potential to drive down healthcare costs.
While disposing of gag clauses may prevent secret deals and selective discounts that lead
to escalating costs, some economists believe that price transparency at the provider-payer level
could have the opposite effect of actually raising prices charged to patients. Thus, thorough
economic analysis of the effects of this type of initiative in different market settings is necessary.
b. Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
Most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses have also had similar effect on the healthcare
market, stifling competition and driving up healthcare costs.69 In the healthcare market, MFN
clauses occur most often when large insurers with substantial market power agree to pay “must66

See supra Part II.
Paul B. Ginsburg, Market Watch: Shopping for Price in Medical Care, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE, Feb. 6,
2007, at 208, 211 (citing Hibbard & Peters, supra note 38).
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Kaiser Family Found., Transparency & Complexity (Aug. 13, 2012), http://policyinsights.kff.org/en/2012/august/
transparency-and-complexity.aspx (stating that while simplified assumptions make it easier for health plans to
produce coverage illustrations, mis-estimating costs make the price information must less useful to consumers
because the effect on the plan differences is masked).
69
Cutler & Dafny, supra note 36, at 894–95.
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have” providers a higher than fair price to have them in their network. These agreements can
have the effect of setting a minimum price for all medical services covered by the contract.
“Thus, the cost of such services incurred by a dominant insurer with an MFN clause can become
the minimum price for all other competitors in the market that deal with those same providers.”70
As a result, MFN clauses can make it impossible for new insurers to offer a competitive plan in a
given market because of the inability to negotiate the same or lower prices with “must-have”
providers.71
To have a competitive advantage, an insurer must ensure that it pays the lowest price for
important providers, not that it pays a low price. As a result, large insurers do not need to use
their leverage to negotiate lower costs and can accommodate higher price demands from
providers. Any additional costs can be passed on to consumers in the form of higher premiums.
In the healthcare market, the existence of MFN clauses in insurer-provider contracts has hindered
alternative delivery systems and interfered with competition, causing prices to rise.72 Like
initiatives to prevent MFN clauses, price transparency initiatives would enable large insurers to
negotiate to obtain the lowest prices applicable to a “must-have” group of providers. However,
this might cause must-have providers to charge higher prices overall, rather than lowering them.
Further, price transparency initiatives would also allow competitor providers to see the higher
prices other providers have been able to negotiate and demand to be paid those prices as well,
which could drive up the cost of healthcare across the board. However, without price
transparency, certain markets may fall prey to great insurer bargaining power. Insurers could
continue to offer certain providers lower rates and better camouflage costs, perpetuating arbitrary
rates rather than rates that are competitively-driven.
Contractual barriers, in the form of gag clauses and MFN clauses, inhibit efforts to
increase healthcare price transparency. These barriers exist in large part due to market
concentration and increased provider leverage, which in turn can be used to hinder competition
and drive up insurance premiums.73 However, at this stage, economists can only speculate as to
the current impact of these clauses on healthcare prices and the effects of prohibiting them on the
future of the healthcare market. Greater economic analysis of healthcare market conditions and
behavior must be conducted before complete price transparency can be implemented by the
prohibition of confidentiality clauses.
2. TRADE SECRET BARRIERS: PRICE INFORMATION AS TRADE SECRETS
Confidentiality clauses and agreements in contracts also raise the question of whether
healthcare prices—that is, the negotiated rates in insurer-provider/hospital contracts—are trade
secrets, such that insurers could defend against the mandatory disclosure of a price transparency
initiative.
Trade secret law is determined on a state-by-state basis. To date, 46 states have adopted
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).74 The UTSA was intended to codify section 757 of the
70

James F. Doherty & Monique Ras, Most Favored Nation Clauses in Payor/Provider Agreements, at 3, available
at http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/documents/MFN6.pdf.
71
Cutler & Dafny, supra note 36, at 894.
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Id. at 895.
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See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations – The Fork in the Road, 364 NEW ENG. J. OF
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Problems, 3 HEALTH L. OUTLOOK, 6, 9 (2010).
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First Restatement of Torts,75 which defines a trade secret as including “not simply information as
to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business . . . [but] a process or device for
continuous use in the operation of the business.” At common law under Section 757, the
“continuous use” requirement effectively excludes ephemeral events, such as specific sales price
information, from protection. The UTSA, however, eliminated the continuous use requirement.
This change, arguably, may broaden the definition of what kinds of information can be afforded
trade secret protection, so as to include pricing information.76 The inclusion of price
information, however, ultimately remains uncertain in the healthcare market because it has yet to
be resolved by the courts.
The threshold question in trade secret law must be whether the information is a trade
secret. Usually the answer is determined when the holder of an alleged trade secret files a
misappropriation claim, alleging that someone or some entity has used or disclosed their trade
secret information through improper means.77 If the information is determined to be a trade
secret, that information is protected only against misappropriation. If no trade secret exists, an
alleged misappropriator is not liable under the state’s UTSA, even if the information was
improperly acquired.
In terms of possible healthcare price transparency mandates, the analysis will not focus
on whether price information has been misappropriated; before such mandates are in place, no
misappropriation can occur. Rather, this analysis must preempt a misappropriation claim and
examine whether a transparency initiative can force insurers and providers to disclose their
pricing information without running afoul of their legal ability to protect their alleged trade
secrets. This will depend upon whether pricing information meets the definition of a trade
secret.
3. DEFINING PRICE INFORMATION AS A TRADE SECRET
The 1984 Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as follows:
‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: (1)
Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to the public or to other person who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.78
Whether information is a trade secret is a question of fact;79 the court will objectively determine
whether a trade secret exists. A party’s belief that information is secret or contractually
confidential may be a factor in the analysis, but is not dispositive.80
a. First Prong – Unknown information with economic value
75

Commissioners’ Comment to Uniform Trade Secrets Act §1, in TRADE SECRETS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 986
(Brian M. Malsberger ed., 1st ed. 1997) (stating that the purpose of the Act is to “codif[y] the basic principles of
common law trade secret protection”).
76
Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices: How Medical Device Manufacturers Are Seeking
to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187 (2009) (citing Commissioners’ Comment
to UTSA § 1, in TRADE SECRETS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 80, at 3084, and stating that the purpose
of the omission of “continuous” in the Act is to “extend[] protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity
. . . to put a trade secret to use.”).
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Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(b).
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Id. § 3426.1(d). This language comes directly from the U.T.S.A. and is not unique to California.
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San Jose Const., Inc. v. S.B.C.C., Inc., 155 Cal.App.4th 1528 (2007).
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The first prong of the USTA definition is more easily understood when broken down into
two separate elements: (a) information not generally known, and (b) independent economic
value. Each will be discussed separately, followed by the final definitional prong of “secrecy
measures,” effectively creating a three-part test.
(a) Information not generally known. First, the information claimed to be a trade secret
must not be generally known or readily ascertainable by business competitors or others to whom
the information would have some economic value.81 A party alleging misappropriation of trade
secrets must initially be able to identify the trade secrets with “reasonable particularity” prior to
discovery.82 This flexible standard requires the party to identify the alleged trade secret in a fair,
proper, just and rational manner under all circumstances so that the trial court can control the
scope of discovery and allow both parties the opportunity to prepare their case.83 In certain
cases, a court may require the party claiming trade secret protection to “separate [the instant
subject matter] from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge to those
persons who are skilled in the trade.”84 A court will often require a party to draw this distinction
when the nature of the alleged trade secret makes a detailed description, alone, inadequate to
allow the opposing party to learn the limits of the trade secret and to develop defenses, or to
allow the court to effectively control the scope of discovery.85
(b) Independent economic value. The second element of the first prong requires that the
information derive value from the fact that it is a secret. The value of the information to a
competitor must be substantial; it is insufficient to know that it might have been merely helpful.86
To determine what value is substantial, it is necessary to compare the alleged secret information
to information generally known.87 This requirement was codified from the common law
requirement that a trade secret reflect a “competitive advantage,”88 which is especially helpful to
insurers and providers wishing to keep their negotiated pricing confidential so as to maintain a
competitive advantage against the rest of the market participants. The focus, therefore, is on the
greater value of the alleged secret information in comparison to information of general
knowledge. Any unrelated value or the value of efforts expended to create the information is not
conclusive evidence of substantial value, although both are relevant to the analysis.89
b. Second Prong – Secrecy measures
The second prong of the test requires the party alleging secrecy of information to show
that they have made reasonable efforts to keep the information secret. To satisfy this prong, the
party must show that its secrecy efforts make it difficult for a third party to acquire the
81
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information, except by improper means.90 Such efforts include, among others, imposing an
obligation of confidentiality, such as a confidentiality clause in a contract, to prevent others from
sharing the information. Conversely, information easily obtainable, sold on the open market, or
discovered by reverse engineering cannot constitute a trade secret.91
(1) The effect of the Restatement’s and the USTA’s definition on the courts
Due to the rather amorphous definition provided by the USTA for trade secrets, many
courts have referred back to the First Restatement to help narrow what kinds of information can
receive trade secret status in other markets. Courts that have decided cases related to commercial
transactions and business investments have still invoked the “continuous use” requirement to
exclude ephemeral information and align the definition of trade secrets with the legislative intent
of the UTSA.92 One federal district court in New York concluded that although a company had
taken all the necessary measures to maintain the secrecy of its pricing information, prices
fluctuate over time in any market and cannot receive trade secret protection.93 However, since
New York has not adopted a version of the UTSA, but only the common law definition of trade
secret from Section 757 of the Restatement of Torts,94 this case may inform, but is not binding as
to interpretation of trade secret law in states that have adopted the USTA. Courts in USTA
jurisdictions may nonetheless find the New York district court’s ruling to be persuasive authority
in future cases of first impression.
Courts may also deny trade secret designation if the information has been disclosed even
to a limited set of individuals. Therefore, price disclosures to customers on an individual basis
have been found to evade trade secret protection because of the theory that disclosure would not
necessarily end with the individual consumer, but could continue to be disseminated by that
consumer to other third parties.95 These courts reason that once the consumer has possession of
allegedly confidential information, the seller’s competitor can easily obtain that information from
the consumer.96 This case law seems to suggest that proponents of price transparency could
successfully defend against trade secret claims if so much as one line of price data was made
available to an individual consumer. In particular, the fact that Aetna has made complete price
information available to its members on its website may be enough to withstand a trade secret
defense asserted by the insurance company.97
(2) Pricing in healthcare: unanswered by the courts
Two federal district court cases in Minnesota and Pennsylvania attempted to tackle the
question of whether healthcare pricing can be protected as a trade secret. In each case, Aspen
Healthcare Metrics (Aspen) and Emergency Care Research Institute (ECRI), respectively, urged
the court to find that the prices hospitals pay for implantable medical devices manufactured by
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Guidant Corporation do not qualify as trade secrets as a matter of law.98 In opposition, Guidant
asserted trade secret protections for the “prices paid by hospitals to Guidant for its devices.”99
Each court denied motions for summary judgment, ruling that a genuine issue of material fact
remained as to whether Guidant’s pricing information met the above three-step analysis.100
Ultimately, both cases settled on confidential terms before trial, leaving the merits of Guidant’s
trade secret claims unexamined.
Consequently, the proprietary nature of pricing information in the healthcare context
remains unresolved. As for the first prong of the trade secret analysis, healthcare pricing
information remains unknown and arguably has substantial independent economic value such
that politicians, policymakers, and economists alike have long been advocating for increased
price transparency in the healthcare market. However, these cases may serve to strengthen the
second prong of the trade secret test. The confidential nature of the settlement agreements may
serve as further evidence of the companies’ substantial measures to maintain the concealment of
their prices, weighing in favor of affording them trade secret protection.
(3) Acquiring price information from government agencies
If a state, through legislation or regulation, mandates disclosure or invites voluntary
disclosure of pricing information to a government agency, such as its state exchange under the
ACA, the state government’s ability to share that information with competitor-insurers/providers
or the public at large in light of trade secret protections is unknown. In some instances, a
company may disclose information to a third party while still maintaining secrecy of the
information through contract, such as a gag clause. When the third party is a government
agency, however, the analysis becomes more complicated.
In California, for example, intentional disclosure of proprietary pricing information by a
state agency is governed by the California Public Records Act (CPRA).101 The CPRA provides
that public records are open to inspection by members of the public, unless exempted by law, and
must be made promptly available upon request.102 The law allows individuals to bring actions to
enforce disclosure of information if they feel it has been wrongfully withheld.103 A public record
includes any writing retained by any state or local agency, regardless of physical form or
characteristics.104 “This definition is intended to cover every conceivable kind of record that is
involved in the governmental process and will pertain to any new form of record-keeping
instrument as it is developed.”105 As a result, if the state or local government has negotiated with
providers for discounted rates on healthcare services, those contracts may be obtainable via
98
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CPRA. Further, if California passes legislation or regulation that mandates disclosure of
healthcare price information to a government entity, individuals may be able to enforce
disclosure of that information which may, in turn, negate a trade secret claim by the owner of
that information.
Some exemptions to CPRA do exist. While no statutory exemption directly applies to
information disclosed pursuant to a state transparency initiative, three kinds of exemptions may
apply to healthcare pricing information as well as to trade secrets - §6254(q) exemptions, the
“trade secret exemption,” and the “catchall exemption.” Each could be used by insurers and
providers wishing to maintain the secrecy of their individual prices.
Section 6254(q) exempts, in part, negotiations with providers of healthcare services by
special negotiators who represent the State Medi-Cal program. It also exempts portions of a
provider contract with Medi-Cal containing rates of payment for three years from the date of the
contract. This and all other exemptions must be narrowly construed.106 Since no such
exemption exists for private insurer negotiations or contract provisions with providers, it seems
unlikely that private insurance companies and providers could successfully challenge disclosure
of pricing information should it be lawfully retained by the state through a transparency
initiative. Furthermore, even if individuals sought to challenge disclosure of information by a
government agency, CPRA would not allow them to bring actions to prevent the disclosure.
However, the government may appear hypocritical if its agencies collected and disseminated
data from private insurance companies, while still maintaining the secrecy of its own healthcare
price information.
The trade secret exemption prevents disclosure of all trade secrets under CPRA if their
disclosure “is exempt or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law including…the Evidence
Code relating to privilege.”107 Although the exemption references only the Evidence Code as
basis for trade secret protection, it has been interpreted to incorporate by reference all statutory
and common law bases for the protection of trade secrets, including the UTSA.108 Thus, the
analysis returns to the original inquiry to determine whether the information qualifies as a trade
secret.
The catchall exemption protects confidential information if “the public interest served by
not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure.”109 Private
insurers could contend that the risk of healthcare price increases posed by price transparency is
high enough that disclosure of healthcare price information does not serve the public’s interest.
While reputable data and analysis exist about the possible negative outcomes of price
transparency, without more conclusive studies in the healthcare market this argument is unlikely
to meet the onerous burden of clearly outweighing the benefit of disclosure. Further, recent case
law suggests that it is becoming increasingly difficult to protect proprietary information under
the catchall exemption.110
Finally, local city ordinances may provide additional regulations pertaining to disclosure
of proprietary information. San Francisco’s Sunshine Ordinance, established by Chapter 67 of
106
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the San Francisco Administrative Code, is the city’s version of the CPRA.111 Under the
Sunshine Ordinance, the Director of Public Health may withhold proposed and final payment
rates for managed care contracts for its employees.112 However, just like the CPRA, this
exemption, narrowly interpreted, does not extend to private health insurance contracts with
providers and hospitals.
The potential for insurers or providers to claim that the specific prices negotiated in their
contracts constitute trade secrets could be a substantial barrier to price transparency initiatives.
In general, the courts have left substantial uncertainty as to whether healthcare prices deserve
trade secret protection.113 However, in California, the exemptions to CPRA should support an
argument against offering trade secret protections to healthcare price information.114 Further,
private entity negotiations under Section 6254(q), combined with a showing that, on balance,
public disclosure of healthcare prices weighs in the public’s interest under the catch-all
exemption, seem to suggest that those entities seeking trade secret protection will have an uphill
battle.115 If California courts affirmatively denied trade secret protection to healthcare price
information, such a decision could serve to clarify muddied precedents in other states as well.
4. PROVIDER RESISTANCE
In addition to legal barriers created by gag clauses and trade secrets claims, provider
resistance may create a substantial barrier to improving the transparency of healthcare prices at
the provider-insurer level. Even if the contractual and trade secrets issues were eliminated,
provider leverage and resistance have the capacity to render price transparency initiatives
ineffective and therefore should be readily addressed in any price transparency initiative.
Providers may resist price transparency initiatives mandating public reporting and antitransparency clauses in their contracts.116 For instance, Aetna’s online description of its price
transparency initiative cites “provider resistance as limiting the extent to which they can make
price information available to their members.”117 This resistance to transparency is logical, if
physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis.118 In a fee-for-service system without
transparency, physicians are financially incentivized to order increasing numbers of tests and
procedures because most consumers have no way of knowing the costs or the relative benefit of
the procedure. In a value-based purchasing system, which the ACA hopes to achieve, price
transparency can actually help improve quality of care while lowering costs. For example,
providing greater reimbursements for physicians who provide increased preventative care and
follow-up visits after certain procedures can shift provider incentives away from quantity of care
and toward keeping patients well and out of the doctor’s office.119
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The San Francisco Sunshine Ordinance (added by Ord. 265-93, App. 8/18/93; amended by Proposition G,
11/2/99), available at http://www.sfbos.org/index.aspx?page=5551#67.2 (last accessed Oct. 8, 2012).
112
Id. at Sec. 67.24(e)(2).
113
See Cardiac Pacemakers, supra note 103 (where the lawsuit settled before the court could decide the trade secret
claim), and Nunes v. The Hospital Committee for Livermore-Pleasanton Areas (Cal. Ct. App., May 29, 2012,
A131060) 2012 WL 1925537 (an unreported case where, similarly, the court ruled on a motion for summary
judgment before tackling the question of alleged trade secret protection).
114
See Gov. Code § 6254(q), (k) and § 6255(a).
115
Gov. Code § 6254(q); GAO REPORT ON PRICE TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 9.
116
GAO REPORT ON PRICE TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 27.
117
Id. at 22; see also Aetna’s Healthcare Cost Transparency Tools, http://www.aetna.com/producer/e.briefing/200902/nat2_09_trans.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).
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BROWNLEE, supra note 70.
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Id.
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Not all providers oppose price transparency. Some have spoken out in favor of it. In
written comments prepared for the August 25, 2012 California Health Benefit Exchange Board
Meeting, insurers, provider groups, and other healthcare advocacy groups who partner with
providers expressed their support for the exchange staff’s recommendation to prohibit antitransparency clauses (gag clauses) in insurer-provider contracts.120
Their support for
transparency incorporated all of the above-mentioned intended effects, including cost-savings
and creating well-informed consumers as a way to drive consumerism and lower prices.
Although price transparency has seen some support from provider groups, in most instances,
those seeking to advance a price transparency initiative should be prepared for resistance from
providers.
V. EMPLOYER-LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY
Employers represent a third target group for potential price transparency initiatives aimed
at decreasing healthcare spending. At a time when employers are facing a number of long-term
challenges, such as controlling costs, improving employee engagement and accountability, and
determining how to comply with new healthcare reform legislation, price transparency initiatives
targeting employers that either purchase health insurance or healthcare services directly from
providers have great potential to reduce overall healthcare costs.121
Employers become consumers of healthcare when they contract with insurers to offer
health plans to employees. If employers could obtain both quality information on the providers
included in a health plan as well as the negotiated prices, they could begin to use their leverage
as purchasers to demand higher value plans and avoid plans that pay inflated rates to certain
providers. Knowledge of insurer-negotiated prices will also enable self-insured employers to
demand lower prices and develop networks of high value providers. Employers, especially large,
self-insured employers, are in a better position to accumulate and analyze price and quality data
than individual consumers and they also have the ability to leverage their employees’ purchasing
power to negotiate price. Further, groups of like-minded employers, like the Leap Frog Group or
The Pacific Business Group on Health, may have an even greater ability to leverage their
position to insist on higher value plans.122 More so than individual consumers, or even insurers
and providers, employers are uniquely situated to have a game-changing impact on the way price
transparency can affect the healthcare system.

120

Stakeholder Input: Qualified Health Plan Policies and Strategies to Improve Care, Prevention and Affordability,
CALIFORNIA HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE, Aug. 10, 2012, available at http://www.healthexchange.ca.gov/
BoardMeetings/Documents/August_23_2012/IX_StakeholderConsolidatedCommentsQHPPoliciesandStrategies_814-12.pdf. Those expressing support of prohibiting anti-transparency clauses in provider contracts included the
California Pan-Ethnic Health Network, Castlight Health, Health Access, VSP Vision Care, Pacific Business Group
on Health, Blue Shield of California. However, Blue Shield of California believes it is too soon to address contract
regulation because (a) providers will resist, and (b) it is too soon before apps for QHPs are due to change any
existing contracts. The lone group in opposition was the California Medical Association, due to a worry about a
lack of concomitant provider protections and no way to protect providers from inaccurate and unfair reporting.
121
See infra PartVI.D.
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See The Leapfrog Group, http://www.leapfroggroup.org, and The Pacific Business Group on Health,
http://www.pbgh.org.
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A. EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE
Employer-sponsored health insurance is the leading source of health insurance in the
United States, covering about 149 million persons under age 65.123 Employer-sponsored health
insurance premiums have continued to rise in recent years, rising three and four percent for
individuals and families, respectively, from 2011 to 2012 alone.124 One factor that contributes to
increasing cost is continued demand for plans with broad healthcare networks for their
employees. In the 1990s, managed care organizations with narrow provider networks received
immense backlash due to the public perception that the narrow networks amounted to indirect
healthcare rationing.125 Employers consequently began to demand broader provider networks
from health plans to satisfy employee desire for greater provider options.126 This demand gave
providers significant bargaining leverage to negotiate higher payments from insurers, and even
greater leverage for certain “must-have” providers,127 especially hospitals, while leaving other
providers, with less influence, to accept lower payments in comparison.128
Since the economic recession began in 2008, employers have increasingly shifted a larger
amount of the growing healthcare costs onto employees in the form of high deductible health
plans (HDHPs).129 In both the individual and employer markets, HDHPs are the latest trend in
health insurance, frequently accompanied by either a health savings account or reimbursement
arrangement.130 HDHPs require consumers to pay out-of-pocket for healthcare services up to a
certain threshold, e.g. $10,000, before the health plan will begin to cover a portion of healthcare
costs like a traditional PPO plan. HDHPs thus trade lower monthly premiums for higher
deductibles, in an effort to reduce the moral hazard that typically accompanies insurance.131
Enrollment in HDHPs has grown rapidly over the last five years. Based on data from
2011, 52.4% of persons with a private plan, directly purchased or obtained through means other
123

KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-07.pdf. 56.2% of the non-elderly American population receives
insurance coverage through an employer-sponsored plan.
124
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2012
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 1 (2012), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2012/8346.pdf.
125
David Mechanic, The Rise and Fall of Managed Care, 45 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 76 (2004).
126
Id.
127
Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep Payment Increases from Insurers
Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973, 973 (2012) (defining physicians and hospitals as
“must-have” providers if they are necessary to attract employers and consumers, or they provide a unique service to
a certain geographic area).
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Id.
129
A Milliman, Inc. study released February 13, 2012 found that the ACA’s Medical Loss Ratio rule may make it
difficult for HDHPs to compete against higher-cost low-deductible plans in a ACA Insurance Exchange. The study
also concludes that the Medical Loss Ratio creates disincentives for insurance companies to continue offering
HDHPs. See Mark E. Litlow et al., Impact of Medical Loss Ratio Requirements Under PPACA on High Deductible
Plans / HSAs in Individual and Small Group Markets http://www.hsacoalition.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/Report-ABAImpactofMedicalLossRatioRequirements.pdf. However there is increasing
literature to the contrary. See Parente and Feldman, 48 Health Services Research 826 (2013), stating there is a
growing sense that HDHPs will do well, particularly in the Bronze and Silver category plans.
130
A health savings account (HSA) is a tax exempt account owned by an individual consumer. Funds contributed to
an HSA roll over and accumulate year-to-year, and job-to-job, if not spent. A health reimbursement arrangement is
an employer-funded account that reimburses employees for out-of-pocket medical expenses and premiums, where
any unused dollars remain with the employer.
131
Moral hazard exists when an insured individual consumes more services or engages in riskier behaviors than he
or she otherwise would because he or she is shielded from the true cost of care by insurance.
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than employment, were enrolled in an HDHP, up from 39.2% in 2007.132 Employers, too, have
discovered HDHPs as a cost-saving solution to the rapidly rising cost of insuring employees,
with 26.9% of individuals with employer-based coverage enrolled in an HDHP in 2011, up from
15.6% in 2007.133 This shift to HDHPs means that insured individuals are, arguably for the first
time, incentivized to pay more attention to the price and quality of healthcare. Unfortunately,
unlike the rapid growth of HDHP enrollment, the availability of price information to consumers
has not grown with equal speed.134 However there is a wide literature suggesting that insured
consumers, no matter how much of their healthcare bill they are required to pay upfront, simply
will not use additional price information to change the way they shop for healthcare.135 As a
result, recent price transparency initiatives often target consumers, but initiatives focused on
other entities including employers, providers, and insurers may prove more effective.
B. BARRIERS TO EMPLOYER-LEVEL PRICE TRANSPARENCY
Each of the barriers that hinder price transparency at the individual consumer and insurerprovider levels also prohibits employers from obtaining transparency price and quality
information to aid them in choosing higher quality, more cost-effective health plans for their
employees.
First, legal barriers, such as gag clauses and trade secrets protections, will similarly
prevent employers from demanding pricing information that will enable them to select low-cost,
high-quality health plans. If employers are unable to compare health plans based on both price
and quality, it will prove very difficult to convince their employees that a switch to smaller
provider networks is in their best interests. Further, efforts to maintain the secrecy of contract
terms also minimizes the need for providers to compete for employer-sponsored plan purchasing.
Second, questionable consumer usage may prevent employers from demanding smaller
network insurance plans with lower costs and higher quality. Employers will need their
employees to be engaged participants in order for them to make such a great sea change in their
purchasing habits.
Third, provider resistance to price transparency prevents competition in the healthcare
market, which, in turn, can prevent employers from effectively comparing the cost and quality of
health plans. Lack of provider competition operates as a disincentive to reveal pricing to
purchasers of healthcare.
VI. CURRENT TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES
Not dissuaded by the significant barriers to price transparency, state governments, private
insurers, and independent private entities have initiated programs relating to price transparency
and the disclosure of healthcare charges.136 This Part examines these existing initiatives to
132

2011 NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, supra note 6, at 6. These figures are based on persons under age
65 with private health insurance.
133
Id.
134
Jon B. Christianson et al., Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Down but Not Out, CENTER FOR STUDYING
HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE (Issue Brief No. 137), Oct. 2011, at 2.
135
See Carl E. Schneider and Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health Care?, AM. J. LAW
MED. 2009; 35(1):7-65, concluding that mandated disclosure is unlikely to accomplish the goals of shaping how
medical consumers should behave. See also Kristin Madison and Peter D. Jacobson, Consumer-Directed Health
Care, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 107 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/CDHC.pdf, debating the
future of consumer-directed health care.
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Madeline Kreischer, et al., State Actions Relating to Transparency and Disclosure of Health and Hospital
Charges, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/transparency-
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improve disclosure, transparency, and reporting of provider charges and fees. In recent years,
California has enacted a range of programs aimed at improving access to healthcare information
for consumers. This Part will first examine California’s combination of efforts, and then examine
the initiatives of other states, a private insurer, and independent private entities.
A. CALIFORNIA LAWS AND CURRENT TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES
California currently has four separate transparency initiatives pertaining to healthcare
cost, quality or both. Each current initiative has the potential to target all three levels of price
transparency – insurers, providers, and consumers. First, this section evaluates the Payers’ Bill
of Rights, which requires unwaivable, mandated reporting by California hospitals of prices for
certain procedures.137 Second is an assessment of California Hospital Compare, a website that
gathers data via voluntary reporting of quality measures.138 Third, this section provides an
overview of California legislation aimed at increasing price transparency in the healthcare
market: SB 751 allows insurers to disclose price and quality information to their members,139 SB
1196 allows healthcare claims data to be disclosed to qualified entities.140
1. PAYERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS
Sections 1339.50-56 of the California Health & Safety Code, also known as the Payers’
Bill of Rights, seeks to prevent hospitals from “gouging patients” and to help inform patients of
the cost of healthcare procedures. 141 It requires each hospital to disclose their average billed
charges for the twenty-five most common inpatient and outpatient procedures to the Office of
Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD).142 OSHPD then publishes these charges
to its website, while hospitals must make the list of procedures and charges available to any
person upon request.143 Any person who believes a hospital is in violation of the Payers’ Bill of
Rights may file a claim with the California Department of Public Health (CDPH), which
investigates such claims to determine whether a violation has occurred.144
The Payers’ Bill of Rights also requires hospitals to make its chargemaster, a list of the
hospital’s gross billed charges, for the specific services or items publicly available.145
Chargemaster prices are important because they are prices billed regardless of a patient’s
insurance coverage and are the starting point for discounted prices by insurers.146 While a step in
the direction of price transparency, the chargemaster amounts can represent more than double the

and-disclosure-health-costs.aspx (last visited February 11, 2013) (summarizing signed laws and proposed state
legislation).
137
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1339.52 (waivers prohibited).
138
CALHOSPITALCOMPARE.ORG, http://www.calhospitalcompare.org/about-us.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
139
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1367.49.
140
Id. § 1367.50.
141
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 27.
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Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1339.56 (list of charges for common services and procedures).
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Id. OSHDP publishes both the average and median charges for each service and item.
144
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1339.54 (claims of violations; investigation); see also Healthcare Information
Division: Annual Financial Data General Information About the Hospital Chargemaster Program, OFFICE OF
STATEWIDE HEALTH PLANNING & DEV’T (last updated Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/
Hospitals/Chrgmstr/index.html (“This process would also pertain to any person who has no healthcare coverage and
requested a written estimate from a hospital for healthcare services, procedures and supplies or requested
information and/or an application for financial assistance or charity care and received no response from the
hospital.”).
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Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1339.51 (charge description master; posting; notice).
146
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 19.
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actual prices insurance companies pay for the listed services and, therefore, bear little
relationship to the actual cost of the healthcare services provided to the insured consumer.147
So far, the Payers’ Bill of Rights has had little to no observable effect on hospital pricing.
Several factors contribute to its ineffectiveness. First, each hospital is allowed to determine
which twenty-five outpatient procedures to report to OSHPD, making comparisons between
hospitals’ list of charges not always possible.148 Second, because insured patients do not pay the
prices listed, these prices are not likely to be helpful to the average insured consumer who is
insulated from gross charges via their health insurance plan.149 For example, if the average price
for a hospital stay varies significantly between two hospitals, but the out-of-pocket costs to a
consumer are the same, access to the average price information on a chargemaster is unlikely to
influence a consumer’s decision in favor of a lower cost provider and may even signal the higher
priced provider as offering higher quality services. Consumers in high deductible health plans
(HDHPs) or with a plan that requires coinsurance payments will, however, benefit from knowing
what their provider is charging their insurer, because that, in turn, will determine their out-ofpocket costs. Knowledge of these price figures could allow these consumers to determine
whether their insurer is paying more for a particular service from one provider to another, thus
giving consumers the capability to provider-shop within their network before even making an
appointment. Further, the chargemaster prices are not specific to particular health plans, which
may be of no help at all to insured consumers who are only concerned with the price of a service
as it relates to their plan. Since the total number of insured individuals is expected to rise
dramatically in 2014 when coverage on the health benefit exchanges takes effect, it will become
increasingly important for price transparency initiatives to convey price information based on
health plan.
Third, OSHPD’s website does not provide an adequate explanation of chargemaster
prices to allow the average consumer to decipher the meanings of the listed gross figures.
Instead, the website includes vague disclaimers stating that charges will vary significantly from
one patient to the next. These disclaimers tend to negate the transparency initiative altogether
since the website has no mechanism for disclosing more consumer-specific prices. The website
simultaneously highlights the industry’s complex billing practices by disclaiming the
discrepancies between each patient’s cost of care. More successful price transparency initiatives
provide supplemental information for consumers to consider along with price when making
decisions about a hospital.150 Aetna’s website, for example, provides a more helpful disclaimer
to educate consumers that high quality and low price are not mutually exclusive measures.151
Lastly, comparable quality data is completely absent from the information presented via
the chargemaster. The inclusion of quality data would give the listed prices the necessary
context to be meaningful information for consumers.152 The website does provide volume data,
which could be helpful if paired with quality and price data, allowing consumers to choose
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physicians based on the number of times they have performed a procedure. However, this data
alone is not as useful, and is unlikely to have much effect on consumer choice.153
2. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL COMPARE
A second transparency initiative is California Hospital Compare, a website launched by
the California Healthcare Foundation, in partnership with the University of California, San
Francisco, and the California Hospitals Assessment and Reporting Taskforce (CHART) to
compare hospital quality information.154 This website includes ratings for clinical care, patient
safety, and patient experience for over 230 hospitals that voluntarily self-report quality measures
related to the most common procedures. Conversely to OSHPD’s website, the quality data
presented on CalHospitalCompare.org are not linked to price data. The website provides a link
where individuals can go to the OSHPD site to see average pricing data, but without a
connection drawn between the two, consumers are likely to find it too challenging to
successfully integrate the available cost and quality information for effective use in healthcare
decision-making.155
3. ENACTED AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO AVOID CONTRACTUAL BARRIERS TO
TRANSPARENCY
In addition to requiring providers to make price and quality information available, the
California Legislature recently addressed the problem of gag clauses in provider-insurer
contracts by passing two laws that promote healthcare price transparency—Senate Bills (SB) 751
and 1196. Both laws amend section 1367 of the California Health and Safety Code to prohibit
contract provisions that would restrict the transparency of healthcare data, also known as “gag
clauses.” SB 751, effective January 1, 2012, targets transparency at the consumer level by
allowing price and quality information to be made available to enrollees of health plans.156 SB
1196, effective since January 1, 2013, pertains to the disclosure of claims data to qualified
entities.157
SB 751 renders void and unenforceable any contract between an insurer and a licensed
hospital or healthcare facility that contains a gag clause.158
A contract issued, amended, renewed, or delivered on or after January 1,
2012, by or on behalf of a healthcare service plan and a licensed hospital or
any other licensed health care facility owned by a licensed hospital to provide
inpatient hospital services or ambulatory care services to subscribers and
enrollees of the plan shall not contain any provision that restricts the ability of
the health care service plan to furnish information to subscribers or enrollees
153
Hibbard & Peters, supra note 38, at 415–16 (stating that pieces of information that do not inherently relate to
each other, such as trade-offs, create burdensome cognitive processing that will result in consumers choosing to
allow one factor to drive their entire decision making process in order to ease the burden).
154
CALHOSPITALCOMPARE.ORG, http://www.calhospitalcompare.org/about-us.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
155
There is also a way to search for free and discount payment programs for hospital services. See California
Hospital Free and Discount Payment Programs, OFFICE OF STATEWIDE HEALTH PLANNING & DEV’T,
http://syfphr.oshpd.ca.gov/search.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
156
Cal. Health & Safety Code §1367.49, Section 1 of Stats. 2011, c. 244 (S.B.751) (“It is the intent of the
Legislature to ensure that subscribers and enrollees of a health care service plan, and policyholders and insureds of a
health insurer, can make informed decisions about their health care choices.”).
157
SB-1196: Claims Data Disclosure, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION (2012), available at
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120SB1196 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
158
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1367.49(a)-(b) (ability of healthcare service plan to furnish information to
subscribers or enrollees concerning cost range of procedures or quality of services at hospital or facility; contractual
provisions; statement posted on Internet website).
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of the plan concerning the cost range of procedures at the hospital or facility
or the quality of services performed by the hospital or facility.159
The law does not require insurers to disclose this information; it merely removes any contractual
barriers that may prevent insurers from doing so.160 For example, when previously hospitals
would demand confidentiality clauses in insurer contracts, preventing health plans from
disclosing prices paid to those providers to their members, hospitals can no longer prevent those
health plans from choosing to make provider price information available to consumers on their
plans. Although not explicitly stated in the statutory language, SB 751 does not prevent an
insurer from using its discretion to refuse to disclose cost range and quality information to
subscribers. Thus, the law does not mandate price transparency, but merely removes a
contractual barrier to achieving it, should insurers choose to do so.
Two significant limitations of SB 751 are as follows: (1) The law allows only a cost
range to be disclosed, and (2) the timing of the intervention by disclosing cost and quality
information only to subscribers or enrollees of a health plan limits the potential effects of
transparency.
First, by prohibiting contractual barriers to disclosure of the range of costs to consumers,
the legislature has created a similar problem to the Payers’ Bill of Rights—that a potentially
large range of prices for one procedure may provide little, if any, guidance to consumers
attempting to select a hospital. Whether this information will help consumers make more
informed decisions will depend on how narrow the cost ranges are. Disclosure of a larger range
of prices for each facility will restrict consumers’ ability to make comparisons, whereas a smaller
range of prices may allow for better comparison of facilities. Further, this bill received
substantial opposition from the University of California (UC), the state’s fourth largest
healthcare delivery system, in its letter to the Assembly Health Committee Chair opposing SB
751. In its letter, UC stated that the bill’s lack of built-in “means or assurances that consumers
will receive meaningful and relevant information on provider cost and quality” prevents
consumers from receiving the most valuable and accurate information in order to make informed
healthcare choices.161 While SB 751 requires insurers to include several risk adjustment factors
along with any quality measures they choose to disclose to their members, SB 751 mandates no
such risk adjustment factors in conjunction with price information to ensure maximum consumer
usability of quality information. Without certain risk adjustment factors, such as severity of
condition and type of facility (i.e. community hospital or academic medical center), consumers
may be unable to draw meaningful comparisons across hospitals and providers.162
The second limitation of SB 751 stems from the elimination of gag clauses as they relate
to the disclosure of information to health plan “subscribers and enrollees” only, instead of to
consumers prior to choosing a health plan.163 By only preventing anti-transparency clauses from
precluding disclosure to enrollees and subscribers, SB 751 limits the potential for transparency to
lower healthcare costs. SB 751 does not bar contracts from preventing disclosure of price and
quality measures to non-enrollees; insurers and providers may still keep this information secret
159
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from uninsured consumers, preventing consumers from comparing hospital price ranges on
different health plans prior to enrollment. If the law required disclosure of price and quality
information to consumers prior to enrollment, both providers and insurers could be forced to
compete for business at an earlier stage, thus potentially driving down prices not just for one
insurer, but across multiple carriers. Still, these effects depend on whether the healthcare market
reacts to price transparency like a traditional economic market.
One positive effect of SB 751 is that it may provide a defense to a trade secrets claim by
providers and insurers who wish to challenge any mandated disclosure of price information. The
interplay between the California UTSA and SB 751 has not yet been addressed by the courts.
The question remains as to whether cost range information furnished to subscribers of a health
plan under SB 751would make actual prices that insurers pay to healthcare facilities matters of
general knowledge, or whether cost range information is so different from the actual facilities’
prices that those prices can still be considered “special knowledge” under the California UTSA.
Providers could argue that disclosure of cost range information is so broad ( i.e. does not reveal
the actual prices of procedures) that actual price information remains secretive and should
receive trade secret status. However, the possibility that actual price information could be
obtained from the disclosed cost ranges by reverse engineering could cause a trade secret claim
to fail.
SB 1196 appears to take SB 751 one step further. Although the law pertains solely to
price information, it expands the disclosure of healthcare prices beyond just enrollees of health
plans to the public. The law prohibits contracts between a health plan and a provider, including a
provider of supplies, from containing any provision that prohibits, conditions, or in any way
restricts the disclosure of claims data related to healthcare services provided to enrollees,
insureds, or beneficiaries of any self-funded health coverage arrangement to “qualified entities”
as determined by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 164 The Secretary of
CMS recognizes qualified entities to make evaluations of provider/supplier performance and to
agree to meet specific requirements regarding the transparency of their methods and their use and
protection of data.
To be certified as a qualified entity, an organization—“either a single public or private
entity, or a lead entity and its contractors”—must submit to CMS an application package that
includes information demonstrating that the applicant will satisfy the requirements specified in
42 CFR § 401G (401.700–.721), as well as other criteria determined by CMS.165 Among other
requirements, applicants must demonstrate existing expertise and sustained experience (defined
as three or more years) in performance measurement, the ability to combine Medicare data with
existing claims data, a process for allowing providers to review and correct their performance
reports, and adherence to rigorous data privacy and security procedures.166 If it demonstrated
sufficient expertise, an exchange could apply to be a qualified entity; alternatively, a group of
healthcare stakeholders organized as a single entity, as required by section 401.703(a), could
perform the same function. Once determined to be qualified, a multi-stakeholder organization
that represented a range of interests in healthcare could collect price data and determine the best
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way—in the interest of all stakeholders—to use that information. Such an organization could
potentially partner with California's Health Exchange, Covered California, to inform its
decisions.
B. OTHER STATE INITIATIVES
In other states, some current transparency initiatives provide access to complete cost
information, while others use only limited price data. Complete cost information is the disclosure
of a price that incorporates all discounts, includes associated costs such as lab fees, and identifies
out-of-pocket costs.167 Complete cost information allows patients to anticipate all potential costs
they could be responsible for when undergoing a particular procedure. On the other hand, limited
price data or price averages enhance the risk that consumers will feel misled by the information
or not use the information at all.168
While complete cost information can be extremely difficult to obtain due to confidential
agreements between insurers and providers, two price transparency initiatives – one public and
one private – demonstrate that providing complete cost information is potentially attainable.
However, whether transparency will affect consumer decision-making or provider-insurer
negotiations will depend on successful implementation.
The first example is the public initiative of the state of New Hampshire: HealthCost.
Since 2007, HealthCost has disseminated complete medical cost information by insurance plan
and procedure, as well as prices for uninsured consumers.169 Directed at individual consumers
and employers, the website lists specific prices that reflect negotiated discounts and other
reductions from the billed charges obtained through claims data.170 Insured users enter their
insurance plan, their deductible amount, and their percentage rate of co-insurance, and the
website uses that data to calculate their out-of-pocket costs as well as the total cost of the service
by provider. The website is updated quarterly to reflect the most recent changes in pricing.
However, New Hampshire does not provide quality data as a part of its price transparency
initiative. This leaves consumers unable to truly compare providers and leaves open the question
of whether higher prices reflect higher quality care.
Other states have not gone as far in their price transparency initiatives. The
Massachusetts initiative, MyHealthCareOptions, provides a median and range of insurers’
aggregated payments made to particular provider groups and hospitals based on claims data.171
While Massachusetts, like New Hampshire, has access to claims data that could be used to
provide complete cost transparency to its consumers, it instead provides average prices paid by
private insurers for specific services. This is due, in part, to insurers’ and providers’ concerns
about the initiative disclosing insurer-specific information to consumers, as well as a lack of
technical capabilities to identify which hospital and physician data should be linked.172
Consumers, therefore, cannot see a price estimate that is specific to their insurer, much less their
specific health insurance plan or their specific treatment.
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1. PRIVATE INSURER
Similar to New Hampshire’s HealthCost, Aetna’s “Member Payment Estimator” provides
complete cost information to members through access to the insurer’s negotiated discounts with
providers.173 Prices for each service are provided as “service bundles.” This means that when a
member searches for the price of a cesarean section, the generated price includes the costs likely
to go along with that procedure, e.g. anesthesia and blood work, giving members a more
complete picture of the cost.174 For calculating estimated out-of-pocket costs, Aetna links
member data to its price transparency website, which then automatically updates and calculates
the member’s estimated costs in real-time.175 Aetna’s transparency initiative also provides
consumer education that high price does not always mean high quality, and informs consumers
that low cost/high quality healthcare does exist.176 However Aetna’s member-only access to
complete cost information precludes employers and individual consumers from accessing the
Member Payment Estimator until they have already committed to the health plan. Further,
member-only access still prevents other insurers and providers from accessing these figures,
which does not facilitate competition among health plans.
2. INDEPENDENT PRIVATE INITIATIVES
Finally, there exist three private, web-based initiatives that are not affiliated with a
specific insurance plan. The first of these is Clear Health Costs, a company that gathers data
from independent reporting, including from health-care providers, participating consumers, and
other databases, to bring transparency to consumers in the healthcare market.177 The goal of this
website is to “empower[] consumers to make informed decisions about costs of their medical
care and coverage.”178 The website currently focuses on common procedures and items in the
New York City and San Francisco areas, and provides Medicare pricing information for these
procedures in all other states.179 Within the two focus areas, the website provides the highest and
lowest cash prices for uninsured consumers per procedure charged by specific providers, in
addition to varying price reports from the company’s various reporting sources.180
Another private transparency initiative has been launched by Compass Professional
Health Services (“Compass”). Compass provides healthcare pricing information to employers
and individual consumers who pay an annual membership fee.181 In addition to consumer
advocacy and helping consumers and employers to find low-cost, high-quality healthcare,
Compass’s website also contains a blog and news reports on the latest changes in the healthcare
industry, as well as several white papers directed at helping consumers select the best health
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plans and save money.182 For uninsured consumers who are trying to save money on healthcare
costs, Compass does not seem to be the best cost-saving solution. However for employers, a few
hundred dollars per year in membership fees may be worth the 25% savings proposed by
Compass’s services.183
A third private transparency initiative is Castlight Health. Since 2008, this San Francisco
company has been offering an online portal that allows self-insured employers to provide quality
assessment and price transparency information to employees.184 Castlight Health also has
partnered with health plans to help deliver cost and quality information directly to plan members,
including individuals and small businesses, with the belief that enabling consumers to make
better-informed decisions when purchasing healthcare will drive quality up and costs down.
While there are no consolidated results of Castlight’s efforts on their website, the multitude of
positive testimonials suggests that Castlight has successfully enabled employers, employees and
individual consumers to realize significant savings.185
C. EXISTING INITIATIVE EFFECTIVENESS
Each of the state and private initiatives targeting individual consumers discussed above
provide helpful information to consumers, but none provides all the necessary components for
what potentially could be the most effective consumer-targeted transparency. For price
transparency to be most effective, complete cost information must give customers an accurate
and actionable picture of their healthcare costs.186 While the Massachusetts Connector is unable
to provide complete costs, both the Aetna and New Hampshire initiatives have demonstrated that
this level of disclosure is possible. Bare pricing information, however, like that of New
Hampshire’s initiative, without providing more explanation and context, may have the effect of
misleading consumers into believing that higher price is always indicative of better quality
care.187
Ideally, transparency of healthcare prices alongside quality measures would
meaningfully assist consumers, and those making decisions on their behalf (employers, health
carriers, and referring practitioners) in making more informed healthcare decisions.188 Judith
Hibbard, a health policy professor and researcher, argues that consumers will not use information
they do not understand because of unwillingness to go through the process of trying to make
sense of the information and match it up with other factors, such as quality, provider or peer
recommendations, and location.189 The most effective transparency initiative, Hibbard asserts,
will reduce the mass of information into an index that consumers can easily understand. Only
then can consumer choice have a large enough impact on the healthcare market to actually lower
costs.
Theoretically, a more informed consumer population choosing higher-quality and lowercost healthcare services could force providers and hospitals to not only charge competitive prices
182
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for healthcare services, but could also provide an incentive to increase quality of care. Aetna’s
website is an example of this contextual transparency with cost and quality available in concert.
However, Aetna’s transparency falls short of its full potential by limiting disclosure of that
information to its members only. Further, all of these initiatives target the consumer-level only.
At a time when employees and employers have so much more at stake than before, employereducation initiatives like Castlight will also be an integral part of ensuring effective price
transparency.
While state government and private insurers have yet to launch a price transparency
initiative that is proven to lower healthcare costs, each of the three independent private
organizations have sought to fill the regulatory gap and offer employers and individual
healthcare consumers valuable information to help them lower their healthcare costs.
VII. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO PROMOTE EFFECTIVE PRICE TRANSPARENCY
As demonstrated above, price transparency initiatives can be implemented through a
variety of methods. This Part examines a range of potential legal and educational initiatives
designed to promote price transparency. The legal solutions include antitrust litigation,
legislative solutions, and exchange regulations. Next, this Part will explore possible educational
initiatives for employers and consumers to promote price transparency. Part VIII will then offer
recommendations for combinations of potential solutions.
A. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
One possible solution is for states to continue to try to promote price transparency
through legislation. Price transparency legislation will have varied effects, depending upon
particular conditions in the target market. In urban areas with a higher concentration of
providers, less leverage, and greater market competition, price transparency may drive price
decreases, while rural areas with fewer providers may actually see healthcare prices increase.
The potential for geographically varied outcomes results from provider leverage over certain
markets, where more leverage exists for “must-have” providers and providers supplying unique
services within a network.190 As a result, blanket price transparency requirements should not be
implemented through legislation. Instead, the legislature should focus on incentivizing price
transparency in areas with less leverage and greater competition where its intended effects are
most probable. With this in mind, there are three potential avenues for legislating price
transparency.
First, a state legislature could pass legislation that gives the state the authority to certify
individual health plans that provide the best value, both within and outside of the exchanges, as
“Visible Value” plans. Exchanges could require Visible Value plans to meet specified criteria
for lower cost and high quality services. Receiving certification would also signal to consumers
that the plan did not result from any anticompetitive tactics such as MFN clauses or geographic
tying leverage, and that it has value-based financial incentives for provider payment, rather than
fee-for-service. Since complete transparency may not be an ideal solution for all markets, the
law should require that insurers only disclose complete price information negotiated with
providers to the exchange or other state agency in charge of certification in order to determine
certification eligibility. By not releasing full price information to competitors, this will prevent
collusion in less competitive markets while still allowing the state to direct consumers to those
190
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health plans that offer the best quality care for the most competitive price, in the absence of
anticompetitive negotiations.
In terms of transparency to the public, only certified Visible Value plans would be
required to make provider quality scores and premium rates available to the public. Each
certified health plan would be required to maintain quality and cost scores at a minimum level, or
else lose its certification status. In addition to facilitating consumers’ healthcare decisionmaking, this legislative transparency initiative may also incentivize providers to deliver higher
quality care and insurers to negotiate for lower priced, better quality providers, thereby helping
to lower the cost of healthcare statewide.
One challenge of this approach would be gathering and analyzing the cost and quality
data needed to certify the health plans. In California, the cost portion of this data could be
collected by a qualified entity, designated by CMS to gather and disseminate data on provider
performance pursuant to SB 1196,191 and evaluated in accordance with the legislative criteria to
determine which plans are eligible for certification.192 A state could apply to CMS for
designation as a qualified entity for purposes of gathering price and quality data. Other entities,
such as a multi-stakeholder group, could also apply for qualified entity status to enable collection
of this information for Visible Value plans. The quality evaluation, however, would either
require voluntary reporting by health plans, or would need to be collected from a quality
comparison website, such as California Hospital Compare193 or “Health In Sight,” a national
hospital rankings website.194
This process of certifying best-value health plans would differ from the tiered health
plans in that tiering is fundamentally based on cost, whereas this certification will be based
additionally on quality and competitive activity. Because the success of health plan certification
depends on consumer engagement and purchasing of those certified plans, education programs
for individual consumers and employers will be absolutely necessary. Similar to the types of
consumer education found on Aetna’s website regarding provider cost and quality,195 succinct
and usable information must be provided to consumers and employers to ensure full
understanding of the certification process.196
States could also pass legislation requiring an annual review of all insurance premium
increases of 5% or greater. Currently, the Affordable Care Act mandates an annual review of
premium rate increases of 10% or more.197 By mandating an even more strict review, states
191
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could monitor rising costs more closely. States could deny and assess penalties on insurance
companies that are unable to justify their rate increase by demonstrating quality improvements or
increased benefits. If triggered, annual review of premium increases of 5% or greater could also
nullify gag clauses, as insurers would be required by law to disclose information negotiated in
provider contracts in order to justify their desired increase. Penalties and mandatory disclosures
would provide strong additional incentives for insurance plans to keep premium increases below
5%. These mandatory disclosures for auditing purposes would not be disseminated to the public;
however, the information may be requested under a state’s public records law, such as the
CPRA, to facilitate public disclosure.
B. REGULATORY SOLUTIONS
Unlike legislation, which is created by an internal proposal from within a legislative
body, voted on by both the houses and then signed by the governor, regulation can be created by
any state agency with the power to enforce certain laws. While the most opportune regulations
could come from the exchanges, initiatives can also be implemented outside of the exchanges by
state departments of insurance.
Recent healthcare reform efforts create new opportunities to address the gap in consumer
information through the state health benefit exchanges. The ACA requires states to pass
legislation to legally set up an exchange, or else the federal government will administer one for
them.198 The federal law gives states flexibility to set up exchanges in ways that will most
benefit each state, within certain federal guidelines. The creation of state exchanges offers two
opportunities for states to incorporate price transparency initiatives into these new entities: 1)
legislation establishing the exchanges; or 2) regulations created by an exchange to govern
qualified health plans offered on the Exchange. As the first state-created exchange, this section
will use California as a model for analyzing price transparency initiatives at the exchange level.
1. LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE EXCHANGE
In January 2011, California became the first state to create a health benefit exchange with
the passage of Senate Bill (SB) 900 and Assembly Bill (AB) 1602. SB 900 established the
Exchange and created a five-member Board of Directors. AB 1602, the California ACA, creates
the structural framework of the California Health Benefit Exchange, known as Covered
California. The statute grants the Board the authority to determine both the minimum
requirements for carriers to offer a plan on Covered California, as well as the standards and
criteria required for designating a plan as a Qualified Health Plan (QHP) eligible to be offered
through Covered California. Most notably, section 2(a) calls for the creation of a “transparent
marketplace for Californians to purchase affordable, quality healthcare coverage.” Incorporating
transparency language into the legislation establishing Covered California opens the door to
discussion about ways to implement a price transparency initiative in California, with hopes to
pave the way for other states to follow suit.
2. AVENUES TO EXCHANGE REGULATION AND THEIR UNCERTAINTIES
Since California enacted legislation designating Covered California as an active
purchaser, it had the authority to impose requirements, such as price transparency, on health
plans that wish to be a part of the exchange. As one of its first steps to actively negotiate with
health plans, the Board drafted a list of requirements and questions for plans submitting bids to
be on the exchange.199 Covered California asked bidders to describe their current costs, quality,
198
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and efficiency programs, including “activities to identify for members/consumers those providers
. . . that are more efficient and/or lower cost” and “the web-based cost information that the Plan
makes available.”200 Each bidding health plan must also reveal current cost containment
strategies, describe methodology used to combine provider cost and quality metrics,201 and list
any contractual agreements with its participating providers that prevent it from making contract
terms transparent to plan members.202 Based on bidders’ responses, the Board has the authority
to fine-tune its requirements and impose even greater restrictions on insurers. 203
The Board does not currently impose any price transparency requirement on health plans
that wish to participate in Covered California. However, increased pressure through stakeholder
testimony and written comments at meetings and in webinars may motivate the Board to
mandate price transparency on the exchange. The Board strongly believes that its efforts should
be guided by input from stakeholder groups.204 As a result, it invites public testimony and
submission of written comments at its meetings, allows stakeholders to give panel presentations
on particular issues, and holds separate webinars to assess stakeholder values and concerns. This
willingness to listen to and incorporate stakeholder feedback provides an opportunity to advocate
for incorporation of transparency initiatives within the exchange.
While additional price transparency initiatives are unlikely to be incorporated into
existing contracts for plans that initially want to participate in Covered California, those
initiatives could be incorporated at a later date. At this stage, the Board appears to have
considerable authority to impose requirements on health plans to shape the operation of the
exchange.205 The Board did include certain reporting requirements for plans that want to
participate in Covered California, but so far they largely focus on quality reporting.206 The
Board should also consider similar reporting requirements for healthcare service, device, and
procedure prices. However, Blue Shield of California wrote in comments to the Board that while
it would favor a prohibition of anti-transparency clauses, it was too late to amend or change their
contracts with providers for Qualified Health Plans, as bids were due to the exchange in January
2013.207 If the Board is reluctant to add requirements to the initial plans, once fully established,
Covered California or the California Department of Insurance, which regulates insurance
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practices within the state, could impose additional regulations to promote price transparency on
plans offered within Covered California.
The commitment to transparency in AB 1602, along with Covered California’s position
as an active purchaser, places it in an influential position to shape the ways health plans and
insurance companies disclose price information to consumers on the exchange and to hold
insurers accountable for meeting those requirements. But as it stands, the Board has not utilized
its full authority to promote price transparency on the exchange. Evaluating current transparency
initiatives employed by plans seeking inclusion in Covered California should be just the first
step. To ensure consumers on the exchange have access to meaningful price and quality
information in order to make educated decisions about plan selection, the Board will need to use
its regulatory power to require transparency of complete cost information, like the New
Hampshire and Aetna initiatives have suggested. If key stakeholders can communicate to the
Board the importance of such initiatives, it may be feasible for the Board to incorporate them
into Covered California in the near future. Requiring price and quality reporting as part of health
plan certification on Covered California has the potential to improve consumer decision-making
and spur competition in the healthcare market.
Furthermore, state exchanges may have a role to play in promoting competition and
constraining the use of provider leverage to drive up costs, which in turn could promote price
transparency. As ACOs move from being offered as part of the Medicare Shared Savings
Program (MSSP) into the private market, the “biggest obstacle” to the ability of ACOs to obtain
the triple aim of (1) better care for individuals; (2) better health for populations; and (3) slower
growth in costs through improvements in care,208 is “provider market power.”209 In many ways,
the introduction of ACOs into the private market “asks the private sector to respond responsibly
to changes that are rife with possibilities for opportunistic behavior.”210 The vertical and
horizontal integration of providers required to create an ACO will offer even more opportunities
to collude on prices and obscure pricing information. “Must have” hospitals and dominant
physician specialty groups that have been able to command higher reimbursement rates from
private insurers are unlikely to volunteer to change the way the way they practice medicine in
ways that would limit their profit margins, rather they are more likely to seek out ACO
opportunities that will further entrench and expand their market power.211
In anticipation of these potential risks, CMS enlisted the cooperation of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to establish some guidelines for
walking the delicate line between encouraging ACO market entry and deterring potential
anticompetitive effects. The Final Statement issued by the FTC and DOJ articulates the general
antitrust enforcement policies the agencies will apply to ACOs including “safety zones” for
market concentration levels within common service areas, and rule of reason analysis for joint
negotiations with private payers, rather than strict scrutiny.212 But many feel that these
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regulations do not go far enough.213 All in all, the Final Statement represents a relaxation of
antitrust standards for ACOs, but as Thomas Greaney has pointed out in particular detail, of
greater concern are the significant regulatory options to avoid anticompetitive behaviors that the
federal government has not taken.214
Specifically, in the Final Statement, CMS, FTC, and DOJ decided to remove a condition
from the Proposed Statement that would have required that all ACOs seeking certification from
CMS undergo mandatory antitrust review prior to certification for participation in the MSSP.215
Such a provision would have discouraged the creation of ACOs with structural components that
created opportunities for anticompetitive behaviors, and also given the antitrust agencies
additional bargaining leverage in dealing with ACOs engaging in anticompetitive conduct.216
The federal agencies’ bypass of stricter antitrust review and enforcement offers an opportunity
for regulation at the state level, and particularly by the exchanges, to guard against further
entrenchment of provider market power that drives price occlusion and increased health care
costs.
3. REGULATORY RECOMMENDATIONS
State regulation can take many forms. First, the largest mandate a state could require
would be to mandate price transparency of all plans offered by any insurer, regardless of whether
the plan is offered on the exchange. Second, the exchange, through its contracting power as an
active purchaser, could implement a certification process for health plans that meet more
rigorous cost and quality measures. For these certified Visible Value plans, an exchange could
mandate disclosure of complete price transparency, including negotiated prices to providers, by
insurers to the exchange only, while allowing the exchange to publish quality and premium
information to the public. This type of selective price transparency would serve to protect
against over-disclosure of price information that may have unintended consequences, such as
collusion, which could raise prices.
A similar model of this type of certification exists currently on the Connector, the
healthcare benefit exchange in Massachusetts. The Connector screens each carrier based on a
high standard of quality and rates each on a scale of one to four stars consistent with the National
Committee for Quality Assurance.217 One report reviewing the Connector cautions that
exchanges must strike the right balance between setting the bar too low and not effecting any
change, and imposing too many requirements and running the risk of “be[ing] unable to attract a
sufficient mix of the plans that consumers want.”218
Additionally, an exchange board might consider creating various sub-portals within the
exchange based on geographic market. A similar division of healthcare markets could also be
implemented by a state Department of Insurance, which may be more equipped to determine
which geographic regions would respond most positively to consumer-driven competition.219 By
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actively dividing the state into regional healthcare markets, the governing body can then choose
which regions would respond best to certain transparency initiatives and only implement them in
those areas. Currently, the California State Legislature has proposed such a division to partition
the state into thirteen healthcare regions.220 Likewise, California’s Insurance Commissioner,
Dave Jones, has proposed an 18-region plan, arguing that an increased number of regions will
lower possible premium increases due to the differing cost of healthcare among communities.221
Finally, exchange boards may wish to set up a portal to track which parts of the exchange
website consumers visit and what they consider when choosing insurers and providers. If a
board creates a price transparency initiative and wishes to track consumer traffic on its website, it
should partner with healthcare economists in order to begin generating data on how healthcare
consumers respond to certain initiatives in order to continue to fine-tune them.
Although the effects of regulations and statutes, so long as they are not conflicting, are
similar,222 regulations serve to fast-track the above initiatives. While a board can only impact
those health plans offered on the exchange, by implementing these initiatives through regulations
both the board and the Department of Insurance can begin annual reviews and certifications more
immediately, instead of waiting out the long and potentially futile legislative process.
C. EMPLOYER AND CONSUMER EDUCATION INITIATIVES
On the other hand, legal and regulatory actions are not the only potential paths. A silver
lining to our country’s recession and its effect on the healthcare market is that now is likely the
most opportune time, on many levels, to implement price transparency initiatives. With
employers increasingly shifting more healthcare costs onto their employees via high deductible
health plans (HDHPs), and employees’ salaries unable to keep up with the growth rate of
healthcare, consumers have more incentives to be cost-conscious when purchasing healthcare
products and services than ever before. With consumers paying closer attention to healthcare
prices, and providers, in turn, taking notice of consumer healthcare trends,223 both employers and
consumers are poised to be target audiences for price transparency initiatives.
1. CONSUMER-LEVEL INITIATIVES
Targeting consumers directly with price transparency initiatives will be harder and may
prove least effective of all possible avenues in lowering healthcare prices overall. Pricing
information varies from consumer to consumer based on insurance carrier, type of health plan,
and geographic location. Further, not all price information will be relevant to all consumers.
This means that effecting change on a consumer level will require disclosing price information
on a variety of levels to incorporate all the necessary variables to influence enough consumers to
make a difference in healthcare spending. Creating and designing an initiative that would allow
http://www.dmhc.ca.gov/aboutthedmhc/law/
law_default.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
220
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221
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222
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consumers to retrieve specified price information based on several variables would cost more
than simply mandating that providers disclose their negotiated reimbursement rates. It would
require gathering those rates for each provider and insurer contract, as well as quality measures
from each provider, and distilling that information into streamlined figures that can be
manipulated through an Internet portal to compare such variables by insurer, health plan,
location, and budget.
The next step in disclosing healthcare costs to consumers is ensuring usability of that
information. As they currently exist, hospital billing codes, methods of healthcare service
bundling, and the various levels of cost-shifting (from numerous providers, to insurers, to
employers) make comprehension of healthcare pricing extremely difficult for the average
consumer.224 But given the trend of enrollment in HDHPs, a growing number of consumers are
poised to start paying more attention to healthcare expenditures. Although there is still no
guarantee consumers will use available cost and quality information when purchasing health
insurance or choosing a provider, there are certain ways of presenting more meaningful cost
information that will serve to educate consumers. Also, a younger generation of healthcare
consumers may be more familiar with and willing to use these kinds of online tools to evaluate
health plan and provider options.
For any generation, the more meaningful transparency information is to consumers, the
more likely it is to influence their healthcare decision-making. Separate disclosure of price and
quality information, as is typical, is too fragmented to be useful for consumers.225 Rather,
presenting cost and quality information either in a side-by-side comparison or a separate scale
that is easy to understand may inspire healthcare consumers to act more like consumers in other
markets, resulting in lower overall healthcare costs.226
One solution to promoting usability of transparency information is to develop a website
that enables consumers to enter their health plan, medical condition, and geographic location to
generate a list of available providers and their prices and quality scores. This initiative would
require higher start-up costs than other price transparency measures. For instance, it would
likely require the development of software to convert thousands of healthcare products and
services, at thousands of facilities, into one state-wide scale of measurement. This initiative,
however, is a prime example of a model that may qualify for demonstration grant funding under
the ACA, which could alleviate state implementation costs.227 If consumers begin to use this
information in large numbers to choose lower cost providers, which remains a significant
question, they could reduce provider leverage and healthcare costs overall.
2. EMPLOYER-LEVEL INITIATIVES
Higher spending for hospital, physician, and other clinical services accounted for over 80
percent of premium increases between 2005 and 2009.228 As it stands, employer demand for
broad provider networks gives providers substantial leverage to contract for higher prices with
insurers in order to participate in their network. In a market with substantial provider leverage for
224
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“must-have providers”, transparency initiatives could cause insurers to pay more for all provider
groups, if they reveal that they pay higher prices to dominant providers.229 Once exposed, it is
more likely that other providers will also demand higher prices, rather than the “must-have
provider” reducing their prices. Insurers can regain leverage by convincing employers to shift
their preferences to narrower, but high quality, networks. With provider payment and quality
information transparent to employers, employers would then have the tools and knowledge to
demand plans that offer particular low-cost, high-quality providers. This would allow employers
to save money on healthcare benefits and, at the same time, to offer employees greater value
healthcare.
Narrow and tiered networks have already gained some traction in the small group market,
especially when combined with consumer-driven health plans, such as HDHPs.230 For example,
in Indianapolis, where consumer-driven health plan enrollment is high, health plans focus on
helping employers see the benefits of choosing those plans that incorporate lower-cost, highquality services, thereby narrowing the network of providers needed on a given health plan.231
By educating employers about the value of certain providers, insurers are not only saving money
themselves, but they also help employers save money on healthcare costs and provide better
value care for their employees. Unfortunately, this strategy has been circumvented by the
manipulation of billing codes, whereby providers attempt to convolute insurers’ ability to
determine which facilities provide lower-cost services.232 To thwart this potential barrier it will
be necessary, as mentioned in Section IV.C.3, to demystify billing codes for employers as well
as individual consumers.
Consumer-driven plans not only incentivize individual consumers to stay healthy, but
also change the nature of the healthcare market. In theory, consumers enrolled in HDHPs will
pay closer attention to the cost of their day-to-day healthcare than those on traditional health
plans with copays. Since enrollees of consumer-driven health plans have incentives to be costconscious consumers, efforts to introduce employer-level transparency and to educate both
employers and consumer would allow employers to choose health plans with smaller networks of
high-quality, lower-cost providers and communicate those better value plans to their employees.
This employer-based strategy will prove most effective at reducing healthcare costs in
geographic markets with a wide range of choices among physicians and hospitals, because it will
increase transparency and, therefore, competition among providers to be recognized as lowercost, high-quality providers that employers should want to direct their employees toward. This
type of initiative will prove less effective in markets with provider monopolies or few
competitors.
Shifting the leverage from providers to employers (and individual consumers) may also
yield particularly beneficial results in the self-insured employer arena. In order to educate
employers about the potential cost-saving power of a price transparency initiative, it is likely that
human resources departments, insurance brokers, and private companies, like Castlight Health
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will need to play a role in helping employers understand their options.233 For instance, Castlight
creates an online space where employees of self-insured employers can shop for healthcare based
on price, quality and how much of their deductible is already spent. By educating employers
about how to, in turn, educate their employees, data gathered by Castlight demonstrates that
helping self-insured employers aid their employees in informed healthcare decision-making can
change employee behavior.234 As the main purchasers of healthcare, employers should exercise
some leverage of their own. If large companies demanded price transparency, whether through
an intermediary such as Castlight or on their own, providers who once were able to leverage
higher prices against blind employers would either need to produce evidence of value or else
accept lower payments.
To realize this change, self-insured employers may negotiate lower prices in exchange for
incentivizing employees to use the provider, as Lowe’s Company has done with the Cleveland
Clinic.235 The North Carolina-based company encourages its employees from all across the
country to travel to the Cleveland Clinic for high quality heart procedures at comparatively low
prices.236 Because of the size of Lowe’s employee base, the arrangement was beneficial enough
for Lowe’s that it agreed to pay for all travel and lodging costs for employee-patients and a
companion, as well as waive a $500 deductible, among other out-of-pocket costs.237 Through
employer initiative and innovation, Lowe’s is able to offer better quality healthcare to its
employees at a lower cost. If more self-insured employers can demand services, compare the
cost and quality of healthcare nationwide, and incentivize employees to seek out recommended
providers, not only may employers realize savings, but individual consumers may also see the
effects of transparency on their costs as well. For example, it may be difficult for providers to
continue demanding higher payments for individual consumers when their prices and quality
information, now transparent to employer-consumers, suggest services are worth less.
D. ANTITRUST SOLUTIONS
As discussed above, dominant providers and insurers can use their market power as
leverage to drive up healthcare prices and conceal the increases from employers and consumers.
While antitrust regulation offers a potential path to address anticompetitive behaviors going
forward, antitrust litigation offers a way to break down existing market power by protecting
consumers—not competitors—from anticompetitive actions in the marketplace.238 Because the
healthcare market is rife with market inefficiencies,239 dominant parties in healthcare are
especially able to leverage their market power and thereby make wealth distributions even more
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lopsided, which contributes to the high price variation between hospitals.240 In combination with
price transparency and antitrust legislation or regulation governing health care providers, an
antitrust suit can help force dominant parties to reveal their competitive prices by making market
conditions more responsive to changes in consumer demand. This section will analyze three
potential avenues for bringing an antitrust suit to promote price transparency.
1. CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS BETWEEN PROVIDERS AND PAYERS
The Sherman Act is the primary vehicle for U.S. antitrust enforcement.241 Section One of
the Sherman Act prohibits multiple parties from engaging in a “contract, combination, or
conspiracy” that constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade.242 To prove a Section One
violation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a multi-party agreement243 and that the
agreement is an unreasonable restraint.244
Certain contract provisions between providers and insurers may constitute unlawful
contracts under Section One. Most notably, most favored nation (“MFN”) clauses that guarantee
insurers they are receiving a provider’s best rates—a form of payment parity agreement—open
the door for antitrust liability by limiting the prices that providers can charge to other insurers.
MFN clauses can harm competition by locking in payment levels, thwarting innovation, and
preventing price competition.245 In addition, agreeing to an MFN clause causes providers to lose
any incentive to offer lower prices, because they must offer the same low price to all insurers,
which results in an increased equilibrium price throughout the market.246
MFN challenges are commonly brought against dominant insurers, as in the case of the
Department of Justice’s challenge to Blue Cross Blue Shield in Michigan, which dominates the
Michigan insurance market with anywhere from 40% to 80% market share across different
geographic areas.247 Establishing liability under this theory would require evidence that insurers
have used MFN clauses to force providers to charge competing insurers higher rates, thereby
unreasonably restraining trade. Despite the anticompetitive harms caused by the enforcement of
MFN clauses, however, it is unclear what the impact of such a suit would be on price
transparency. Furthermore, the strongest MFN suit would challenge dominant insurers, but the
240
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economic literature suggests that dominant providers are more of a problem in keeping prices
hidden from consumers.248 Breaking down dominant insurers’ market power may also make
them less powerful negotiators to challenge these providers. Thus, while such a lawsuit might
have some success in breaking down entrenched market power, it may not be the best route to
achieve price transparency.
2. TYING ARRANGEMENTS
Another theory of antitrust liability under Section One is unlawful tying, which occurs
when a company uses its market power in one product to coerce the purchase of a second,
separate product.249 To prove a tie, there must be (1) two separate products involved, (2) a tie
requiring the purchase of the tied product as a condition of buying the tying product, (3)
sufficient market power in the tying product to make the coercion possible, and (4) a not
insubstantial effect on interstate commerce in the tied product’s market.250 A party is harmed by
and therefore has standing to challenge an illegal tying arrangement if it is either a purchaser
forced to buy the tied product or a competitor prevented from competing in the tied product’s
market as a result of the illegal tie.251
a. Unbundling Services
One potentially unlawful tie in the healthcare market is hospitals’ bundling of services in
their negotiations with payers, which effectively masks the prices of individual services.
Litigation would address hospitals’ conditioning of insurers’ purchase of services in which they
have market power (the tying product) on the purchase of distinct, non-dominant services (the
tied product). For instance, if a hospital offered the only neurosurgery department in a
metropolitan area, it could require an insurer to pay a single high price for all services provided
at the hospital in order to include the hospital’s neurosurgery services in its network. Forcing the
separation of those services that are not functionally related will reveal the discrete values of
each service, thus enabling insurers to negotiate for the true value of each service and therefore
set more efficient prices for consumers. For consumers willing to accept narrower networks, this
would allow for the creation of health plans that offer greater value for cost.252 This theory of
tying, however, might face difficulty in court due to the perceived and actual benefits of
bundling services,253 but with careful analysis of the impact on consumers, the availability of
alternatives, and the ease of entry into the market, appropriately tailored antitrust litigation could
help break apart distinct services. A price transparency initiative could then provide consumers
with accurate information about those services.
b. Breaking Geographic Ties
A second possible incidence of unlawful tying exists in the practice of dominant hospital
networks abusing their market power in one geographic market (the tying product) to coerce
insurers to purchase their services in other geographic locations (the tied product). Insurers have
highlighted this concern, pointing to provider networks that span several geographic markets and
248

See, e.g., Berenson et al., supra note 24, at 974.
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
250
FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION 99 (July 2004);
see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
251
Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 461 F.3d 1249, 1266 (10th Cir. 2006).
252
See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health Care, 89 OR. L. REV.
847, 877 (2011).
253
Stephanie Alessi, Using Antitrust Law to Increase Efficiency in the Healthcare Market (2013) (on file with
authors).
249

43

WILLIAM & MARY POLICY REVIEW

[VOL. 4:319

insist health plans contract with them on an “all-or-nothing” basis,254 thereby allowing providers
to increase rates and impose non-price requirements that prevent cost-containment and
transparency.255 To date, a claim of geographic tying has not been alleged and therefore would
have to overcome many legal hurdles, but because of the tendency of these ties to harm
competition, courts may be willing to apply antitrust liability to this conduct under a theory of
tying.
Most notably, of the four elements of an unlawful tie, proving the existence of two
separate products will be difficult. Patient demand for services in distinct geographic regions
may demonstrate that two hospitals in one network satisfy the separate products test,256 but the
case law is unclear as to whether an unlawful tie can exist where the two products are part of the
same network but in different geographic markets.257 Although this argument aligns with the
general justifications for prohibiting tying,258 a court may be unwilling to distinguish between
separate products offered by a single hospital network that operates as a single company and
negotiates on a broad geographic scale. Furthermore, establishing the second element, the
existence of a coercive tie, requires proof that the tie coerced the insurer to purchase the tied
product; that is, if the insurer might have contracted with the hospital in the tied market
notwithstanding the tie—the difference being only the amount it paid—there might be a strong
argument against the establishment of antitrust liability.259 Finally, the last two elements of the
claim—market power and foreclosure of a substantial amount of competition—both require
intensive economic analysis, including analysis of market share and barriers to entry in the
primary market, as well as procompetitive and anticompetitive effects in the secondary
market.260 If these elements can be proven, challenging these geographic ties has the potential to
break up market power and force providers to negotiate rates separately for their services in each
geographic region.
When paired with price transparency, breaking these ties should enable insurers to
negotiate competitive rates and, in turn, allow employers and consumers to engage more fully
with the healthcare marketplace. Specifically, if hospital networks are forced to negotiate rates
that reflect the products they are offering in the immediate geographic region—without the
added leverage of a distant must-have provider—they should no longer be able to maintain
anticompetitive, artificially high rates after the ties are broken. In geographic regions where
254
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hospital networks lack leverage in the form of must-have providers, the public release of price
and quality information would give insurers and consumers sufficient information to arrive at
efficient market solutions in rate negotiations and purchasing decisions, respectively. Thus, a
price transparency mandate that follows successful geographic-tie-breaking antitrust litigation
could be highly beneficial to consumers, at least in certain regions. In regions where networks
include must-have providers, however, those networks would likely maintain their market power
and ability to maintain high prices. There, a price transparency mandate could result in a parallel
price increase across providers who would now have full access to the rates their competitors
were receiving, allowing them to raise their rates to the same level.261 Consequently, even if
antitrust litigation is successful in breaking apart geographic ties, the benefits of any price
transparency regulation targeted at regions with the added leverage of a must-have provider must
be carefully weighed against the potential of causing other providers to increase their prices.
3. ANTITRUST OVERVIEW AND REQUISITE FACT-GATHERING
Any of these options will first require gathering facts about the markets, competition, and
contracts at issue. Important evidence to gather will include: contract terms that might constitute
unreasonable restraints; the impact of contract provisions on competition; accurate measures of
market power; economic analysis of product and geographic markets; and measures of the
impact on competition caused by the alleged unlawful agreements.
In considering whether litigation would be worthwhile, it is also important to consider
whether the remedy will be simply an injunction or treble damages and what the deterrent effect
of that remedy would be, both on the specific entity against whom the case were brought and as a
more general deterrent. To change widespread behavior, antitrust enforcement is costly and
uncertain, but simply targeting a small number of dominant parties would demonstrate the state’s
willingness to challenge anticompetitive behavior and discourage other provider organizations
from abusing market leverage.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The most effective combinations of these solutions will include two elements: (1) one
that targets provider leverage by discouraging anticompetitive behavior, and (2) another that
mandates disclosure of price information. For instance, breaking apart geographic markets,
alone, risks only reforming healthcare pricing in the select areas where geographic ties exist. On
the other hand, merely requiring price transparency may have the unwanted result of driving up
healthcare costs in some markets. In combination, however, these elements have the potential to
effectively lower healthcare costs across each state. There are multiple different methods for
combining these two elements, which are discussed below.
A. “VISIBLE VALUE” STANDARD CERTIFICATION
Certification of health plans under the “Visible Value” standard through administrative or
legislative action also has the ability to dismantle geographic tying and implement price
transparency. The Visible Value standard would be a set of criteria created by a state exchange
or Department of Insurance whereby health plans could voluntarily submit cost, quality, and
anticompetitive activities data to the exchange in order to apply for certification. The exchange
would then list these criteria on its website and indicate which plans on the exchange were
certified under this standard.
To receive certification, a health plan would need to meet three conditions. First, the
exchange boards, or other government agencies, would determine a plan’s best-value criteria by
261
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evaluating the price and quality measures of each plan. This data could be collected entirely by
voluntary disclosure from each health plan as part of the application process. Second, a health
plan must demonstrate it is not a product of any anticompetitive tactics, such as geographic tying
leverage. This may incentivize providers to refrain from anticompetitive activities in order to be
included in a Visible Value standard health plan. Third, a certified health plan must show that
provider reimbursement rates are based on value-based payment systems, rather than on a feefor-service basis. These three conditions, along with the subsequent criteria, could be made
transparent to consumers via publication on a state exchange website. With the proper consumer
education, this initiative not only incentivizes health plans to meet these best-value standards, but
also has the benefit of helping to usher consumers toward these plans.
Through these mandated disclosures, the certification process stands to provide states
with health plans of great value and integrity. If a large number of consumers purchase Visible
Value standard plans, more insurer-provider partnerships may be motivated to follow suit.
B. EMPLOYER-LED LEVERAGE FLIP
Taking a market-based approach, a second solution would use education initiatives to
inform employer healthcare purchasing incentives. This strategy would encourage employers to
exercise their leverage as purchasers and demand price transparency from providers and insurers.
In geographic markets where consumers have a wide range of choices among physicians and
hospitals, initiatives to improve education and make information more widely available would
empower healthcare purchasers to force sellers to compete with one another in the market. In
those markets where price transparency is most likely to be effective, this strategy would enable
employers to demand the price and quality information they need. In contrast, markets with
fewer competing parties would see minimal effects from employer-driven demand for
transparency and thus should not be targeted.
Education initiatives should focus on making human resources departments aware of the
potential cost savings they can achieve by highlighting and incentivizing lower-cost healthcare
options for their employees and offering narrower and more efficient provider networks.
Healthcare consumers have grown increasingly cost-conscious in recent years,262 so they are
more likely to be responsive to financial incentives. By encouraging employers to demand
smaller, high-value provider networks, it is possible to harness this cost-awareness and thereby
give the employer-purchasers of healthcare an increasing amount of bargaining power against
dominant sellers. Self-insured employers are in a particularly good position to lower their costs
in this way by encouraging their employees to make more efficient healthcare purchasing
decisions in exchange for lower premiums and out of pocket expenses.
To make these initiatives most effective, the analysis of, and education about, healthcare
options should be driven by a multi-stakeholder organization. Including representatives from
business, provider, insurer, and consumer groups can ensure an even-handed analysis of
healthcare value that fully considers all perspectives and potential costs and benefits. Once
appropriately informed with objective information, employers could use their new power as fully
informed purchasers to match the negotiating leverage of providers and insurers. Consequently,
dominant parties would be less able to hide price information or engage in other anticompetitive
tactics like tying the purchase of their services in one market to those in other markets.
C. HEALTHCARE MARKET REGIONS
262
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A third mechanism for implementing both necessary elements is promulgating regulation
through the State Department of Insurance or similar government agency to divide the state into
independent healthcare regions and, simultaneously, mandate price transparency in the more
competitive regions. The independent regions would represent distinct product markets that
would prevent dominant providers from abusing their market power in one market by coercing
the purchase of their services in another. Unlike the difficulty of proving distinct markets posed
by antitrust litigation,263 this regulatory initiative would clearly outline each region, eliminating
providers’ defense that they are merely selling services in a single, state-wide market. The
creation of the regions would serve to eliminate the existing geographic ties among regions,
thereby breaking up market power and forcing providers to negotiate rates for their distinct
geographic services.264
The Dartmouth Healthcare Atlas has established regional healthcare divisions throughout
the United States and currently collects data on a wide range of factors for Medicare patients
living in each region.265 A state could either use the regions created by the Atlas or set up its
own regional division of healthcare communities. While we recommend splitting these regions
further into smaller markets, some markets, such as that for organ transplantation, would
necessarily extend beyond regional boundaries depending on certain healthcare services offered.
Therefore it will be important to specify services when arranging these geographic markets.
The division of a state into separate healthcare markets should be done in a manner to
satisfy the antitrust requirements for defining a geographic market, such that buyers would be
unable to switch to alternative sellers in sufficient numbers to defeat an exercise of market power
by firms in the area.266 Further, healthcare delivery and other data collected could be reviewed
regularly to track market power abuses.
The second half of the regulation would mandate disclosure of healthcare price
information negotiated by insurers and providers. However, the law would require price
transparency only in those regions where “must-have” providers and providers supplying unique
services within that market cannot use excessive leverage to demand higher costs.267 Mandated
price transparency in regions with great provider leverage may result in a rise in healthcare costs
to consumers. As a result, it will be important to first identify those regions where transparent
pricing information would most likely result in lower healthcare costs, and mandate that insurers
and providers reveal their negotiated prices in those regions. A mechanism for monitoring each
region by a government entity such as the Department of Insurance may be necessary to
determine which regions will require these regulations in the future. For added enforcement, the
regulation should also include a provision for regulatory sanctions and alert providers to the
possibility of antitrust litigation.
Although not as precise as a geographic tying claim in an antitrust lawsuit, the creation of
distinct geographic regions can weaken market coercion when accompanied by price
transparency initiatives in those regions most receptive to the positive effects of market
competition.
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D. ANTITRUST LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION/REGULATION
The combination of bringing an antitrust suit to break apart and prevent anticompetitive
tying and passing legislation or regulation to mandate price transparency has the potential to
reduce costs through improving competition. Simultaneously requiring price transparency and
reducing anticompetitive behavior could make prices both visible and fair. The antitrust suit
would likely challenge providers’ higher prices derived from anticompetitive ties linking
geographic markets and/or unrelated services.268 Even the specter of a successful suit could
reduce provider willingness to leverage their power to demand uncompetitive prices.
For this approach to work, antitrust litigation must take place prior to legislative or
regulatory change. Although transparent prices would allow the Attorney General to use
discovery to gather useful data to inform an antitrust suit, because of the uncertain outcomes of
enacting price transparency alone in regions where providers or insurers have substantial
leverage,269 the first step in this process should be using antitrust litigation to break down and
discourage anticompetitive uses of market leverage.270 The results of the lawsuit could then be
used to drive support for potential legislation or regulation.
Despite the potential benefits of this combination of antitrust litigation and legislative or
regulatory change, there is a high risk of failure. The antitrust lawsuit may fail at a number of
stages: The given Attorney General may not be interested in prosecuting the case; the court may
reject the geographic tying claim;271 or the lawsuit may fail for a number of other reasons,
including the inability to obtain price information due to its trade secret status or to gather other
requisite facts to establish liability. Notably, filing an antitrust lawsuit does not guarantee the
disclosure of healthcare pricing information during discovery, particularly if that information is
under a protective order to preserve its confidentiality.272 This may prove to be a substantial
obstacle. Even if the antitrust suit does succeed, which could take a number of years, it may be
difficult to achieve the hoped-for legislative or regulatory measures to make prices transparent in
a meaningful way. Therefore, although this combination has great potential to benefit
consumers, these contingencies suggest the benefits may not be easy to obtain even with a
significant investment in data collection. In the end, this approach requires a substantial
investment of time, money, and manpower, with uncertain prospects for success.
IX. CONCLUSION
The above recommendations combine the breaking apart of geographic regions and the
requirement of price transparency to create an effective attack on rising healthcare prices. In
addition to each of these recommendations, other solutions discussed in Section VII could also
be implemented separately to further ensure the greatest level of success. The first of these two
solutions is stringent evaluation of all insurance premium increases of 5% or more by the
Department of Insurance. The second solution is the implementation of consumer-education
initiatives. The most important aspect of any price transparency initiative will be the education
provided to employers and consumers about the newly available price and quality information.
Without an understanding of how this information can help each group make more informed
healthcare decisions and save on healthcare costs, simply making prices and quality scores
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available to the public will not have the desired effect of lowering the cost of healthcare. But, by
providing employers and consumers with meaningful and transparent information about their
healthcare choices and ensuring that those choices are not exploitative, a well-crafted price
transparency initiative can begin to reduce the inefficiencies that characterize the healthcare
market and make healthcare more affordable.

